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T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the rez.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### 2 ⁠— clash ⁠— open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

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Jimin and I affirm the entirety of the 1AC except the Zavitsanos evidence’s description of mutual dependency

1AC Zavitsanos 19 (Rebecca Sanchez and Mara Mills interviewing Constantina Zavitsanos. Constantina Zavitsanos – an artist who works in sculpture, performance, text, and sound; Zavitsanos lives in New York City and teaches at The New School. Mara Mills – associate professor of Media, Culture, and Communication and co-director of the Center for Disability Studies at New York University. Rebecca Sanchez – associate professor of English and co-director of the Disability Studies program at Fordham University. “Constantina Zavitsanos on Disability, Debt, Dependency” 1/9/19, <https://www.artpapers.org/giving-it-away/>. DOA: 5/19,20, kbb)

CZ: This is a question for Marxism as well. We are told how capital depends on labor, how the dependency of the boss or landlord is parasitic on labor, a powerful host. But the obvious problem here is that dependency is not what’s wrong with the boss. We’re all dependent. The reason that the boss is bad is the opposite: the disavowal of that common dependency, and the cost at which that disavowal is extracted.

#### 1---Capital is parasitic towards labor – an emphasis on care work inevitably devolves into the liberal project of individual responsibility – turns the aff

Fisher 9 Mark Fisher, 2009, Capitalist Realism; excerpt from chapter 2, <https://www.atlasofplaces.com/essays/capitalist-realism/> ND.

Corporate anti-capitalism wouldn’t matter if it could be differentiated from an authentic anti-capitalist movement. Yet, even before its momentum was stalled by the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center, the so called anti-capitalist movement seemed also to have conceded too much to capitalist realism. Since it was unable to posit a coherent alternative political-economic model to capitalism, the suspicion was that the actual aim was not to replace capitalism but to mitigate its worst excesses; and, since the form of its activities tended to be the staging of protests rather than political organization, there was a sense that the anti-capitalism movement consisted of making a series of hysterical demands which it didn’t expect to be met. Protests have formed a kind of carnivalesque background noise to capitalist realism, and the anti-capitalist protests share rather too much with hyper-corporate events like 2005’s Live 8, with their exorbitant demands that politicians legislate away poverty. Live 8 was a strange kind of protest; a protest that everyone could agree with: who is it who actually wants poverty? And it is not that Live 8 was a ‘degraded’ form of protest. On the contrary, it was in Live 8 that the logic of the protest was revealed in its purest form. The protest impulse of the 60s posited a malevolent Father, the harbinger of a reality principle that (supposedly) cruelly and arbitrarily denies the ‘right’ to total enjoyment. This Father has unlimited access to resources, but he selfishly – and senselessly – hoards them. Yet it is not capitalism but protest itself which depends upon this figuration of the Father; and one of the successes of the current global elite has been their avoidance of identification with the figure of the hoarding Father, even though the ‘reality’ they impose on the young is substantially harsher than the conditions they protested against in the 60s. Indeed, it was of course the global elite itself – in the form of entertainers such as Richard Curtis and Bono – which organized the Live 8 event. To reclaim a real political agency means first of all accepting our insertion at the level of desire in the remorseless meat-grinder of Capital. What is being disavowed in the abjection of evil and ignorance onto fantasmatic Others is our own complicity in planetary networks of oppression. What needs to be kept in mind is both that capitalism is a hyper-abstract impersonal structure and that it would be nothing without our co-operation. The most Gothic description of Capital is also the most accurate. Capital is an abstract parasite, an insatiable vampire and zombie-maker; but the living flesh it converts into dead labor is ours, and the zombies it makes are us. There is a sense in which it simply is the case that the political elite are our servants; the miserable service they provide from us is to launder our libidos, to obligingly re-present for us our disavowed desires as if they had nothing to do with us. The ideological blackmail that has been in place since the original Live Aid concerts in 1985 has insisted that ‘caring individuals’ could end famine directly, without the need for any kind of political solution or systemic reorganization. It is necessary to act straight away, we were told; politics has to be suspended in the name of ethical immediacy. Bono’s Product Red brand wanted to dispense even with the philanthropic intermediary. ‘Philanthropy is like hippy music, holding hands’, Bono proclaimed. ‘Red is more like punk rock, hip hop, this should feel like hard commerce’. The point was not to offer an alternative to capitalism – on the contrary, Product Red’s ‘punk rock’ or ‘hip hop’ character consisted in its ‘realistic’ acceptance that capitalism is the only game in town. No, the aim was only to ensure that some of the proceeds of particular transactions went to good causes. The fantasy being that western consumerism, far from being intrinsically implicated in systemic global inequalities, could itself solve them. All we have to do is buy the right products.

#### 2---Refuse to flip the metaphor – doing so reinforces right-wing troupes and is tantamount to bourgeois apologetics

Flisfeder 20 Capitalism is the Parasite; Capitalism is the Virus July 26, 2020 Matthew Flisfeder, <https://socialistproject.ca/2020/07/capitalism-is-the-parasite-capitalism-is-the-virus/> ND.

Popular opinion is sure to read the parasite from the gaze of the elite, in which case it is the poor who are parasitic upon the wealthy. This, after all, is the leading practice of perceiving the abject and the excluded. The poor are typically portrayed as scum; vultures living off of the remainders and shreds of life of the rich. But by asking about the source of the wealth of the elite we are able to understand the reverse. Doing so lets us connect the film to a great number of issues facing us today, which intersect in the capitalist system. As Marx famously put it in Capital, Volume 1, “Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.” From the perspective of capital, then, Marx notes, the labour-power that it has paid for is its property and it is its right to so consume it during the time in which it has paid for the labour commodity. “If the worker consumes his [own] disposable time for himself, [it appears to capital that] he robs the capitalist.”1 As in a camera obscura, Marx’s words describe here the inverted form with which the capitalist parasite is commonly misperceived or kept hidden by the very form of its own crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most of us have had to limit and self-regulate our everyday lives, going into lockdown and quarantine. While millions of people are laid off of work as businesses have ceased operations and are no longer making any profit, the world’s wealthiest few, including big tech giants like Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk, have increased their wealth substantially.2 As the old socialist saying goes, during times of prosperity, profits are privatized and rise to the top, whereas during times of crisis, risk, debt, and loss are socialized, and endured by the expanding bottom. The neoliberal myth of trickle down, it would seem, is only true in the case of socializing losses. It is loss that trickles down while the parasitic capitalists appropriate the world’s wealth, especially and even during a time of great crisis for many. What we see all too often is that the capitalist system, much like a parasite, exhausts and devours global resources, leaving the majority to scramble and fight amongst ourselves for access to basic needs. In this sense, we should see the Park family, not the Kims, as the real parasites of the movie. We should think about the coronavirus in these terms, as well. The virus, not unlike a parasite, infects and replicates, and eats away at all forms of life confronting it. The culprit of the pandemic seems to be the virus itself, this nonhuman force of nature; but what we have been seeing is that, as another popular meme has put it, the real virus is capitalism – that is, the capitalist system that erects further barriers to our collective treatment of the virus. The true crisis is not simply the virus itself, but the limited capacities in the public health care system to meet the needs for treatment amongst the population.3 This is a system, we should add, that has become relatively starved due to decades of neoliberal austerity measures and cutbacks to social and public services, benefits, and institutions that subsidize the costs of life and living, and that provide access to needs. In this sense, capitalism is very much the real virus, indeed.4 Systemic crises are all around us, and not least as we are also currently seeing with the mass Black Lives Matter protests against racism, police violence, and police murders of African Americans, like George Floyd, in the United States.5 The police, Donald Trump, and much of the Right Wing media all want to make the protesters look parasitic upon society.6 Trump has referred to the protesters as “thugs,” while Fox News personality, Tucker Carlson has said that debates about racism are driven by “hysteria” that is spreading like a “disease.”7 But we must remember that, while the corporate media creates the illusion that the people are the robber-looters of society – just as it appears to the capitalist that workers’ use of their own disposable time robs the capitalist from consuming the labour commodity – it is in fact the capitalist, neoliberal and very much white supremacist system that continues to be the true vampire-like parasite, sucking the lifeblood out of the people.8 Beyond Posthumanism Viewed from this angle, we can see how truly topsy-turvy is the parasite metaphor when it originates in the ruling ideology that deflects attention from the parasitic system of capital and projects its own contradictions onto false enemies. This practice is even deployed in much of the critical literature on climate change and the environment. For instance, we should even be hesitant deploying concepts like the Anthropocene and subscribing the fashionable idea that there is an Anthropocentrism at the core of our environmental troubles, for this merely abstracts from the historical relations of empire, capital, and class, as Jason W. Moore describes, displacing environmental and ecological crises onto an ill-conceived notion of humanity as a collective actor, and ignoring the class disparities so well represented in films like Parasite.9 Also unhelpful are the Object-Oriented Ontology and New Materialist thinkers, like Timothy Morton, who are on the brink of declaring that humans are the real parasite of the Earth.10 As Morton himself puts it, “In symbiosis, it’s unclear which is the top symbiont… Am I simply a vehicle for the numerous bacteria that inhabit my microbiome? Or are they hosting me? Who is the host and who is the parasite?”11 The danger in Morton’s contrasting of innocent and alive but nonhuman nature with the guilty and parasitical human species, is that it has the potential to devolve into nihilistic activism, such as “death politics.” For example, Patricia MacCormack’s The Ahuman Manifesto advocates for the cessation of human reproduction and the death of humans with calls for “an end to the human both conceptually as exceptionalized and actually as a species.”12 The risk in seeing humans (as a whole) as the uniform culprit of the global environmental catastrophe is that it misses the systemic forest for the individual trees. While right-wing governments compel and guilt the working class back to work to revivify the coronavirus-slumping economy, and while the anti-racist protesters are labelled “thugs” when demonstrating against a system that degrades and even murders their comrades, the theory of the Anthropocene ends up portraying the victims of the vampiristic system as themselves virus-like and parasitic. In this way, the theory of the Anthropocene ends up supporting the ruling capitalist ideology by portraying humanity, not the capitalist system, just as so much of the historical portrayals of racialized and colonized peoples, as well as the working class, as viruses and parasites leeching off of the system. With so much attention being paid to the problems of the Anthropocene, and less to those of the social relations of capitalism, it is no wonder that post-humanism is becoming the dominant ideology of twenty-first century capitalism. Post-humanism, that is, both as a critique of the hubris of previous historical humanisms, and as an ideology of transhumanist technological transcendence of the limitations of corporeal humanity. On both ends, the critique of humanism displaces the cause of our collective inter-species problems from the capitalist system onto humanity as such. Instead, we should focus our critical attention on the capitalist system, and demonstrate how capitalism is incompatible with all life. We need to move from the prism of the Anthropocene to that of the Capitalocene. Capitalism, rather than the people, is the real virus, the true parasite upon our thriving in the world today. What we need to learn is, not how to be post-human, but how to build and rethink a neo-humanism, in which, as Kate Soper puts it, human beings acknowledge our collective responsibility to each other, to the planet, and to other species – a humanism, that is, in which emancipation is both universal and equitably post-capitalist, and in which human agency drives action rather than the “objective” laws of the market.13 In other words, if capitalism is the parasite, then perhaps the project of Democratic Socialism, or something like it, is the cure. Fantasies of Emancipated Futures Parasite concludes, first with a bloody and violent climax where Ki-taek stabs Mr. Park to death in the middle of the family’s backyard party in a burst of violent outrage. Ki-taek then flees the scene and disappears from sight, confusing the police and the media about his whereabouts. Rather than read the film’s conclusion as an expression of the inevitable violence of the degraded and humiliated working class in the absence of a Socialist alternative, we might instead reflect upon the final moments of the film in which Ki-woo fantasizes about his father’s survival. It is unclear whether or not the final moments of the film are a fantasy scenario that he dreams up about his father. He seems to imagine that his father was able to go back into the bunker, hiding and evading the authorities after killing Mr. Park. Ki-woo imagines that one day he will be able to then earn enough money to buy the house and in that way set his father free. For some Posthumanist thinkers, such as Donna Haraway, the problem of the Anthropocene is in perceiving a time called the future that prohibits us from being fully present.14 Futurisms, according to her are what inevitably lead us toward our demise in a kind of dystopian chaos. We need to, as the title of her book claims, “stay with the trouble.” But can we really imagine telling those suffering from the exploitative and degrading conditions of capitalism, or those suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic, or those affected by rampant racism from an integrated system of white supremacy – can we really imagine saying to the abject: “don’t worry, just stay with the trouble”? Far from offering this un-sagely advice we should instead reflect upon the strategy of the film. It is not by staying with the trouble, but by imagining emancipated futures that we will be driven to set ourselves free from the capitalist parasite.

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#### Jimin and I affirm attendant services work.

#### The term ‘care work’ strips disabled folks of agency. The PIC solves better.

Herring 14, is a Professor in Law at Exeter College, University of Oxford. (Jonathan, “The Disability Critique of Care,” Elder Law Review, 8, 1-15, 2014.)

D From Care to Assistance Many writing from a disability study perspective have argued that we need to shift away from the notion of care, and towards attendant services. For example, the Centre for Independent Living in Toronto posits a clear definition of attendant services: Attendant Services are physical assistance with routine activities of daily living as directed by the consumer. The consumer is responsible for the decisions and training involved in his/her own assistance. Attendant services include: bathing and washing, transferring, toileting, dressing, skin care, essential communications, meal preparation. Attendant services do NOT include: professional services such as nursing care, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, respite care, physician services, 'care' or 31 taking responsibility for the person with a disability. The aim of this shift is to increase the independence of the disabled person.32 They want to control and utilise help to achieve independence, not be the passive recipients of care. Care, it is argued, should be a tool that the disabled person uses to achieve independence.3 3 The focus should be on empowerment, control and choice for those with disabilities, even if selfsufficiency is not possible. The terms 'helper' or 'personal assistant' (rather than carer) are preferred in an attempt to remove any implication that the person needing care is suffering a particular misfortune that needs attention, or that the person is passive in the enterprise. 34 The helper is assisting the disabled person to achieve what they wish for.

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#### US tech leadership is secure, and corporations are essential!

Abbott 21, JD, MA, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center focusing on antitrust, formerly served as the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel. (Alden, *et al*, 3-10-2021, “Aligning Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and National Security Policy”, *Regulatory Transparency Project of the Federalist Society*, pg. 2-5, <https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Paper-Aligning-Intellectual-Property-Antitrust-and-National-SecurityPolicy.pdf>)

II. The United States Plays a Critical Role in 5G Standards Development The U.S. government has recognized that “5G is a critical strategic technology [such that] nations that master advanced communications technologies and ubiquitous connectivity will have a long-term economic and military advantage.”8 The U.S. has had a substantial technological edge over our military and intelligence rivals in foundational R&D for 5G and other next-generation technologies. U.S. companies have long been leaders in the development of previous generations of core mobile standards (2G, 3G, 4G, and LTE). This technological leadership has made it possible for U.S. companies to ensure the security and integrity of the hardware and software products that make up the backbone of the U.S. telecommunication systems. This leadership must continue for the U.S. government to more effectively anticipate potential security risks and take the necessary steps to protect national security.9 Despite this history of clear technological leadership, there are causes for concern. First, a very small number of U.S. companies have made the investments in the overwhelming majority of the R&D necessary to develop 5G.10 Historically, U.S. companies have heavily invested in R&D, which has propelled the U.S. into leadership positions in critical standard development organizations working on foundational next-generation technologies like 5G.11 U.S. companies like Qualcomm play a significant and important role in this process through innovation, patenting, and standard setting, but they are not alone in the global community of high-tech companies.12 Backed by their nations’ leadership, Chinese and Korean companies have also invested heavily in developing the core technologies for 5G.13 The willingness of U.S. companies to invest in R&D is threatened, however. The development of 5G is a bit like a race, with the companies who develop the best technology coming out ahead. While U.S. companies are savvy and talented competitors in this race, aggressive and unwarranted use of antitrust law by U.S. regulators, as well as by foreign antitrust authorities, threatens to put obstacles in these companies’ paths and hinder their ability to lead. III. Overly Aggressive Antitrust Enforcement Hinders American Technological Leadership and Threatens National Security As companies from around the world develop the technology and standards for 5G mobile devices and networks, American companies are under threat by aggressive antitrust enforcement that ultimately redounds to the benefit of these foreign companies, which are economic competitors in countries that are also military competitors of the U.S. Over the past five years, foreign governments, particularly in Asia, have subjected U.S. companies to antitrust investigations that failed to follow basic norms of the rule of law, such as providing basic due process protections.14 These antitrust investigations were a thinly-disguised effort by these countries to force the transfer of U.S. patented technology to their own domestic companies, or to insulate their domestic companies from American competition. In recent years, Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese antitrust authorities have brought nearly 30 investigations against 60 foreign companies across a range of industries, including manufacturing, life sciences, and technology.15 Antitrust challenges undermine intellectual property rights by forcing companies to license their products on non-market-based terms. One prominent example in U.S. history is when the Department of Justice wrung a concession from AT&T to license royalty-free the entire portfolio of 8,600 patents held by Bell Labs in a 1956 antitrust consent decree with the company.16 Today, the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy has observed that “China uses the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China not just to foster competition but also to force foreign companies to make concessions such as reduced prices and below-market royalty rates for licensed technology.”17 Companies have also complained about poor policy guidance and procedural protections under China’s competition laws.18 Others have complained about China’s use of its competition laws to promote policy objectives rather than protect competition and advance consumer welfare.19 In one example, companies raised concerns with Article 7 of China’s State Administration of Industry Commerce (SAIC) 2015 Rules on the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abusing Intellectual Property Rights.20 Under this provision, intellectual property constitutes an “essential facility,” which could allow parties to raise abuse of intellectual property rights claims against patent owners for a unilateral refusal to license their patents.21 Predatory antitrust enforcement actions threaten the ability of U.S. companies to continue to be leaders in 5G technological development. China and other nations with similarly restrictive regulatory frameworks can weaken the ability of the United States to compete in global markets by exacting high monetary penalties from U.S. intellectual property owners or forcing the transfer of their intellectual property to domestic commercial rivals. As a penalty for violations of its competition laws, China can impose exorbitant fines that range up to 10% of a foreign company’s entire revenue in the prior year.22 This is not a legal rule observed in the breach; it has already resulted in fines just shy of $1 billion.23 Another way in which courts in China and other foreign countries are harming U.S. companies is through the use of anti-suit injunctions. One example of this is in the recent patent infringement lawsuit brought by InterDigital, an American high-tech company that has developed key technologies in wireless telecommunication, against Chinese company Xiaomi. In June 2020, Xiaomi filed a lawsuit in the Wuhan Intermediate Court in China requesting that the court set global licensing rates for InterDigital’s patents on standardized technologies. In July 2020, InterDigital sued Xiaomi in India for infringement of InterDigital’s Indian patents. The Wuhan Intermediate Court then ordered InterDigital to stop its lawsuit with its request for an injunction in India. The Chinese court further prohibited InterDigital from suing Xiaomi and requesting an injunction or damages in the form of reasonable licensing rates, or even to enforce a previously-issued injunction, in any other country. If InterDigital does not comply with this worldwide injunction against pursuing legal relief for the violation of its patents in any other country, the company faces a significant fine in China. The type of judicial order issued by the Wuhan court is known as an anti-suit injunction and its purpose is to force an intellectual property dispute to play out solely in a Chinese court at the behest of the Chinese government. These court orders demonstrate China’s desire to become the source of 5G innovation and to dictate the licensing terms of the technology, and the anti-suit injunctions hamstring U.S. companies like InterDigital from enforcing their intellectual property rights anywhere in the world. The unfair use of antitrust enforcement and related legal actions like anti-suit injunctions to weaken U.S. intellectual property rights around the world risks diminishing U.S. global competitiveness in critical technologies like 5G, and further empowers China and others to expand their influence over the evolving 5G technological ecosystem. To the extent the U.S. cedes its dominance in 5G standards development, China will continue its focused efforts to fill that void. Huawei, a China-based company, has increased its R&D spending while growing its share of patents on the standardized technologies comprising 5G.24 The President’s Council on Science and Technology issued a report concluding that Chinese actions in the semiconductor industry, which include a range of policies backed by over $100 billion in government funds, threaten U.S. leadership in the industry and present risks to U.S. national security.25 China’s “Made in China 2025” plan called for China to become a leader in 5G technology, including in the development of the standards for the technology, by 2020.26 The plan expressly favors Chinese domestic producers, calling for raising the domestic content of core components in high-tech industries like 5G to 70% by 2025.27 This issue, however, extends far beyond simply the ability and willingness of U.S. companies to engage in the requisite R&D to participate in the 5G race. Reduced U.S. influence on 5G standard-setting would force the U.S. government to rely on untrusted foreign companies for its 5G product supply. The Department of the Treasury has expressed concern about the “well-known” U.S. national security risks posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies.28

#### The 1ac said all US corporations have lost their right to exist, that links because it gets rid of competitive US tech.

#### Revisionist tech leadership causes nuclear war.

Kroenig & Gopalaswamy 18, \*Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. \*\*Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin. (Matthew & Bharath, 11-12-2018, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/>)

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.

#### Extinction outweighs – any risk is a reason to err neg

Seth D. Baum and Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### 4---The 1AC’s embracement of “care” produces a new form of immaterial labor which becomes the basis for harnessing the body as a therapeutic human tool of recovery

Voronka 2017. . Jijan Voronka is SJE PhD Graduate @ University of Toronto Ontario Institute For Studies In Education. Studies in Social Justice. “Turning Mad Knowledge into Affective Labor: The Case of the Peer Support Worker”. Volume 69, Number 2, June 2017 pp. 333-338.] VR

Turning Mad Knowledge into Affective Labor:

Efforts to include service users as peer workers in mental health research, evaluation, and service provision is ever increasing.7 As care models move toward the more “progressive” (and cost-efficient) practices of harm reduction, recovery, and resilience models, peer workers as “experts by experience” are understood to be uniquely positioned to provide such services and support.8 In this way, madness as an experience and mad as a marginal identity has suddenly become harnessed as a commodity for exchange in neoliberal care and service markets. By far the most recognized, formalized, and professionalized type of this peer labor is peer support work. Peer support workers are hired to use their own experiences of distress, difference, and/or contact with the mental health system to work relationally with and on service users in a variety of settings. Peer support rests on the premise that we use our experiences to connect and relate with service users in ways that other professionals cannot. The roots of current recovery models emerged in the 1980s with the recovery movement, which together with consumer/survivor/ex-patient and mad activism demanded a radical reconfiguration of biomedical approaches to madness confined under the domain of the psy disciplines. With the recovery movement, informal peer support as mutual aid emerged as a way to offer advocacy and support outside the remit of medical authority. However, the meaning and practice of recovery and peer support are significantly recalibrated when they move from “movements” into “models,” and such models (informed by clinical logics and outcomes) are absorbed into dominant mental health practices.9 In Western countries, peer support workers are increasingly employed in dominant mental health care sites: in community mental health teams, drop-in services, veteran and workplace mental health supports, hospital psychiatric units, and forensic units. Formal models for recovery and peer support work have developed and slowly have been streamlined by dominate mental health systems as a newer and less costly way to encourage service users to self-govern. While the kind of labor that peer support workers perform varies depending on organizational context, when employed in dominant mental health systems, peers work within clinical recovery models meant to complement pathological approaches to madness. Peer support work is thus an emerging form of precarious labor that invites people with usually denigrated experiences to work within the preexisting tight boundaries of psy professional workplaces. Throughdour performance as peers, we realize the goal of neoliberal biopolitical projects by embodying the tenets of normative citizenship: by managing ourselves and others, and most important, by getting back to work. But peer work not only reintegrates otherwise excluded identities back into the circuits of productive citizenship; it also constitutes a still-unexplored form of affective labor. Affective labor “is the labour of human contact and interaction, which involves the production and manipulation of affects. Its ‘products’ are relationships and emotional responses: ‘a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion.’”10 Affective labor is thus immaterial in the sense that its products are intangible, even though it is usually corporeal and mixes with material forms of labor.”11 While conceptualizations of affective labor continue to be contentious, reworked, and critiqued, Johanna Oksala notes that this is partly because forms of affective labor are so varied, and we need recognize the different forms of affective labor in context, as well as the novel power relations and political consequences across disparate sites.12 Through our status as peers, mental health models of recovery, resilience, and responsibility are graphed onto our bodies, and as we move through encounters with clients, produce feeling and emotion. A key question here is: to what effect are we deploying our work to orient clients toward feelings and responses that actually encourage compliance and cooperation with dominant conceptual models of mental illness? In my own four-year ethnographic research on peer work, peer support workers discussed work role expectations such as sharing their own recovery journeys (which often follow from-tragedy-to-triumph scripts), disclosing complex experiences of psychiatric medications and drug use, and advising how to effectively negotiate through distress with service users.13 Through peer support work roles, experiential knowledge is being mobilized in particular ways: to modify the emotional experiences of clients. When working within dominant mental health service provision, our inclu- 336 | American Quarterly sion does not transcend the social, legal, political, and economic regimes that organize, manage, administer, and intervene on madness. Our inclusion does little to disrupt structural violence, and rather allows psy powers to proceed. With formalized training in both recovery and peer support work, peers are expected to come to their positions versed in how to draw on resiliency and recovery models of care to promote feelings of empathy, hope, optimism, and empowerment in those they work with.14 Thus the value that mad labor brings to inclusionary practices is used to manage and modify madness. What is lost in current configurations of peer support work is the paid labor that redresses the larger systemic policy, program, and discursive frames that together solidify madness as the site that needs to be fixed In “What Do Peer Support Workers Do? A Job Description,” Nora Jacobson, Lucy Trojanowski, and Carolyn Dewa seek to define the labor that peer support workers do as part of a multidisciplinary team working within a psychiatric tertiary-care facility. They describe the main types of labor that peers do when working directly with clients as advocacy, connecting to resources, experiential sharing, building community, relationship building, group facilitation, skill building/mentoring/goal setting, and socialization/self-esteem building.15 Peer support work is here defined as largely relational: they cite “experiential sharing” as how peers spend most of their work hours, which includes “sharing common experiences; listening to client’s [sic] experiences and sharing one’s own experiences.”16 This individually focused labor is oriented toward modifying the feelings and emotive responses of clients. Further, peer support workers act as symbolic figures: “They provide ‘someone to look up to’ for clients who are seeking ways of living that will help them to meet their goals. For staff, they stand out as exemplars of ‘recovery in action.’”17 Thus it is not only the relations created through “experiential sharing” that evokes and modifies feelings but also our embodied presence as peers within mental health settings that create affective potential for clients, other mental health workers, and peer workers themselves. Yet critical disability and mad studies scholars and activists have argued that focusing on madness as the problem that needs to be fixed distracts from the tyrannies of normalcy and the disablisms that produce our ways of being as illness.18 Orienting peer labor toward producing feelings of hope, optimism, and empowerment in individuals risks ignoring the sociopolitical orders that subject us. Indeed, even advocacy work, long understood as a cornerstone to systemic counterdiscursive cultural production and education work, gets rescripted through peer support work into an individualized form of productive labor.19 While incorporating “people with lived experience” into mental health systems as a way to improve services has been both advocated for and argued against in the long history of consumer/survivor/ex-patient and mad social movement activism, the figure of the peer support worker can show us the limitations of such inclusionary measures. In effect, our labor is directed toward the affective governance of those configured as “like us,” while challenging the larger regimes of power that define and manage “mental illness” remains beyond our job description. As mad activists continue to unsettle recovery and the role that peer support workers play within such systems, we need to seriously consider the question “will the peer ‘movement’ have any functions beyond psychiatry?”20 As mad scholars and activists, we need to continue to reassess how we mobilize and enact our marginalized identities when commodifying our experiences within the systems that sustain our subjugation.

#### 5---Individual strategies fail to influence the world

Reed 16, Prof. of Political Science at Penn (Adolph Reed Jr., 2016, “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” Nonsite, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### 6---Cooption---the last 1ac card is about the struggles of black and brown disabled folk, GMU should not be rewarded for their struggle.

### 1NC---Turn

#### State engagement is crucial for disability reform

Zaikowski 16, author of the novels In a Dream, I Dance by Myself, and I Collapse (Civil Coping Mechanisms, 2016), her fiction and poetry, as well as her essays on language, human rights, and animal rights, have been published widely, MFA in Creative Writing from Naropa University's Jack Kerouac School of Disembodied Poetics, studied psychological trauma and its impact on language (Carolyn Zaikowski, 11-28-2016, “Disabled People Will Die Under Trump: An Emergency Plea To Allies,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/disabled-people-will-die-under-trump-an-emergency_us_583cbed4e4b04e28cf5b8a9b>)

This is an emergency plea to those upset about a pending Trump presidency. I’d like to especially address intersectional feminists, radicals, anarchists, socialists and others in the USA who are able-bodied and drawn towards systems-level analysis and organizing for radical change. People with disabilities and chronic illnesses will die under a Trump presidency. Full stop. We will die because of him. This is an emergency situation and we need emergency solidarity, immediately, from every single one of you. Right now, many of us feel like you do not understand the horror of this situation. Social justice activists, why is ableism so often relegated to the periphery of your analysis? Many disabled people feel right now that they desperately need you and can’t find you. Maybe it’s the cultural lineage of eugenics and Social Darwinism which has created an ableist norm, a veil of neutrality over what is actually a system of domination. Maybe it has to do with an association between disability awareness campaigns and a vague sense of apolitical softness or even conservatism, as if caring about disability is not the job of radicals, but the job of celebrity doctors, colored ribbon campaigns, and concerned suburban moms. Or maybe it has something to do with a sense of not being personally affected by disability. You shouldn’t have to be personally affected by something to care about it, but if helps, here’s a reminder: Every single one of you could become disabled or chronically ill at the drop of a hat, and you’re going to be living under Trump, too. Donald Trump, in addition to being one of the most racist, sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, transphobic, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, classist, capitalist, all-around hateful and terrifying U.S. presidents in history, is also on track to be the most ableist president. His oft-stated goal of virtually dismantling Medicaid and Obamacare is perhaps the most brazen way in which he will boot-stomp and kill disabled and sick folks. (And this is not to mention other health care-related questions: What is going to happen to reproductive rights? What is going to happen to transfolk who use hormones?) But Trump’s nasty ableist ideology doesn’t end at health care. Trump has contributed to an ableist cultural psychology by openly mocking disabled people and he has been charged with consistent ADA violations in his business ventures. This includes cases so egregious that the Department of Justice had to get involved . Trump believes capitalists are “oppressed” by the imposition of the Americans with Disabilities Act and has repeatedly spoken of supporting legislation that would seriously limit the seminal act’s powers. Immediately addressing this emergency also requires immediately addressing ableism’s intersection with other oppressive systems. For example, black folks are 2.5 times more likely to be killed by police than whites and a full half of people killed by police are disabled. This means that Trump’s potential Department of Justice policies, which will leave police even more unaccountable and militarized than already are, will have drastic effects on disabled people in general, and disabled people of color in particular. Indeed, the disabled people who are most at risk for harm and death will be those already suffering other injustices. Many will be people of color and women who are already discriminated against in emergency rooms. Many will be immigrants and migrant workers. Many will be single mothers. Many will be LGBTQ folks. Many will be people who do not speak English, the US’s dominant language. Many will be Native Americans. Many will be severely disabled people needing total care and living in group homes, which are at risk of losing funding. Many will be disabled children in underfunded schools who risk losing their already minimal accommodations. Many will be people who are isolated, without friends or family. Almost all will be working class and poor. I care about the difference between radical and liberal U.S. politics, between politics as usual and actual systemic change. I care about the similarities between Republicans and Democrats and how capitalism, imperialism, sexism, racism, police states, and war have been fostered by both parties. I was even stubborn about supporting Bernie, a lesser of three evils candidate whose seriously problematic pro-war voting record left me deeply conflicted. But there is nothing more privileged than being able to comfortably intellectualize and debate about a Utopian future without having to worry about your physical or emotional survival in the present. Without having to wade through the resultant muck after systems of oppression pit your survival against your ethical purity. This is the first time in my life I have not voted third party. Significantly reduced risk to disabled people in the United States is but one way in which a Clinton presidency would have had immediate, physical, survival-level differences from a Trump one. And always, always, always the complications of ableism get exacerbated by elements like gender, race, class, immigration status, being a member of a persecuted religion, age, veteran status, and being LGBTQ. With Clinton and all of her profound flaws, we could have at least maintained a status quo and kept fighting from there. We could have at least minimized deaths of, and harm against, disabled people. Now we’re moving backwards and many disabled people are going to die. Full stop. So here we are. We have elected a textbook authoritarian. We are in uncharted waters, even for the USA. And right now, more than ever, if you are an ally, then you need to say the word “ableism.” Look at the reality of what Trump might do and say “that is ableist and horrifying.” Say “ableism” in the lists of oppressive “isms” you’ve been making lately in your articles, Tweets, posts, lesson plans, protest signs, and conversations. Look at the terrifying history of what other authoritarians have done to disabled people, then say “ableism” loudly, forcefully, whenever necessary, and mean it with all of your heart and mind. If you want to be an ally, if you want to stand in solidarity in any manner that could be considered feminist, intersectional, radical, or otherwise enlightened, it is required that you develop a sense of passionate injustice about ableism. Able-bodied people, I don’t know how to say it more clearly. This is a literal emergency, as in: Actual emergency rooms will be overflowing. As in: Death and levels of physical and psychological suffering you cannot comprehend. As in: Disabled people don’t historically fare well under authoritarian governments. You need to use whatever platforms you can access to raise awareness, organize, and make constant connections between ableism and its intersections with other injustices and political cruelties. If you have money, you need to donate to disability rights organizations, as well as organizations like the ACLU and Planned Parenthood. You need to write these articles so disabled and sick people don’t have to. You need to learn about issues like rampant physical, sexual, emotional, and economic abuse of disabled people. None of us can be free until all of us are free. So say “ableism” and mean it. We really, really need you. You need to learn about things like invisible disabilities, the obstacles that keep disabled folks from voting, the internalized ableism that makes disabled people hate themselves, and disabled people’s remarkable resistance movements. You need to teach yourself and others about the horrifying history, both in the U.S. and abroad, of human societies’ various attempts to kill and stomp disabled people into the ground. You need to do all kinds of things I can’t think of right now because I have Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome and PTSD and the stress of this election is making me physically ill. The bottom line: You need to act and be sneaky and crafty and smart and do the work. None of us can be free until all of us are free. So say “ableism” and mean it. We really, really need you.

#### heir ev

**Moore 8-6**-2021, MA, economics, syndicated columnist. (Stephen, "Moore: US tech sector keeps besting the world", *Boston Herald*, <https://www.bostonherald.com/2021/08/06/moore-us-tech-sector-keeps-besting-the-world/>)

Take a bow, America. It’s official and irrefutable: The U.S. is **blowing out the rest of the world** in **tech leadership**. **No other country** in the world comes anywhere **close** in **tech innovation** and the dominance of our made-in-America 21st-century companies. The **Nasdaq index** of once-small technology companies reached **15,000** last week. Only a few years ago, that index stood at 5,000. Yes, these companies have **tripled** in their **market cap value** — and that doesn’t include the dividends that have been paid out to large and mom-and-pop shareholders in America and across the planet. We are told constantly that **China** is **catching up** and achieving remarkable digital-age leaps forward in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, green energy, robotics, 5G technologies and microchips. The value of America’s **12 most valuable companies** today in terms of stock valuation is well over $**10 trillion**. Those red, white and blue companies from Silicon Valley to the “Silicon Slopes” of Utah to Boston to northwest Arkansas are worth roughly as much as **all** of the **Chinese publicly traded companies combined**. Firms such as Google — many of which didn’t even exist 30 years ago — have made millionaires off your next-door neighbor. Ordinary people are getting rich beyond anyone’s imagination 50 years ago, thanks to American innovation and inventiveness. Risk-taking, old-fashioned can-doism is a hallmark of this unrivaled success story that has never been matched anywhere at any time in world history. Almost all of this is a tribute to American financial markets that allocate capital in hyperefficient ways. Capitalists doing a spectacular job of allocating capital efficiently is our secret sauce to financial and technological success. I am always mystified when highly successful Wall Street investors can’t explain how it is they add value and sometimes concede that they are just unnecessary middlemen. Even Warren Buffett, one of the greatest of all time, expresses guilt about his billions, as if he and other great financiers are economic parasites. No. Steering financial resources to winners like Google, not losers like Solyndra, makes everyone in America richer. Meanwhile, few politicians have any clue of how capital markets create wealth and jobs and shared prosperity in America. If they did, they would appreciate that without capitalists and capital, there is no enterprise — no material progress. They would instantly understand the economic ~~lunacy~~ of increasing taxes on capital gains and dividends, wealth taxes, and, worst of all, death taxes that threaten the future survival of family-owned businesses. Cutting, not raising, the U.S. capital gains tax would be far wiser if we want America to maintain and widen our competitive lead and keep winning globally. The arrogant fools in the administration of President Biden believe that to keep America No. 1 technologically, we need to have a multibillion-dollar government-run slush fund with the politicians picking winners and losers with other people’s money. China does this, and so does Japan, and it has never worked. One of the most famous stories of government-as-investment banker was when the Tokyo government’s brain trust recommended that Honda not get in the business of making cars. Here in the U.S., the political class has made a $150 billion bet on wind and solar power since the late 1970s, and in return, that has produced only a small sliver of our energy needs. Even more inexplicable is the movement in America coming from senators such as Democrat Elizabeth Warren on the left and Josh Hawley of Missouri on the right to break up our tech companies. Why? Because, evidently, they are too good at what they do. They make too much money. They have too many customers and too many advertisers. Put aside for a moment the rancid political persuasions of some of these leftist Silicon Valley CEOs. Somehow, the left and right agree that building a superior product and even crafting entire new industries is a punishable offense. God forbid. The rest of the world — the Chinese, Indians, Japanese and especially the technologically inferior Europeans — would love to hobble American titans and tax away their profits. The role of the U.S. government should be to repel the foreign attacks. Crazily, the Biden administration has given the green light to foreigners pillaging American companies. This doesn’t put America first. So, can America’s tech dominance continue to **blow away** the **foreign competition** for decades to come? **Bet on it**. That is, **unless** we are foolish enough to **decapitate our own industries** through **regulation, antitrust policies and raising tax rates on success**. The challenge for U.S. supremacy is coming from Washington, D.C., not China.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Affirmation of mutual aid signifies a resignation to the inevitability of capitalism---the 1AC implicitly adopts an anarchist theory of change that cedes the state and the economy to organized capital---that precludes emergence of a revolutionary socialist movement capable of taking power and rendering mutual aid unnecessary

Thomas Hummel 20, activist and a member of Marx 21, 6/29/20, “Mutual Aid Networks: Toward a Constructive Critique,” <https://marx21us.org/2020/06/29/mutual-aid-networks-toward-a-constructive-critique/>

Many of the best activists are currently involved in mutual aid work. The extent to which I understand the importance of these organizations is illustrated by my involvement with the one in my neighborhood where I’ve helped with grocery runs for undocumented immigrants and donated some of my stimulus money to keep the organization going. The organization in my neighborhood has raised over $30,000 and has delivered food and essential aid to an impressive number of our neighbors. While these efforts are incredibly important, we cannot forget that they should be unnecessary. Capitalism and the state that supports it are responsible for a situation in which millions are suffering from privation. In this crisis, the state has been primarily concerned with the maintenance and health of capitalism and has provided only scraps to the vast majority, even as it spends generously to rescue the wealthy. Mutual aid groups have formed to fill this void left by the state’s total disregard for the survival of the most vulnerable. But since these projects often depend upon us sharing our meager resources, they can be very difficult to maintain. The group in my neighborhood, for example, despite its impressive fundraising, is having difficulty continuing its efforts as new donations dry up. If the left were organized and strong, instead of having to scramble to provide these resources for ourselves, we would be able to apply material pressure and demand them from the state and the wealthy elite that the state protects. Origins of mutual aid Looking at the origins of mutual aid philosophy is illuminating. Mutual aid derives from the political philosophy of Anarchism. The term “mutual aid” comes from the anarchist Peter Kropotkin’s 1902 book of the same name, which sought to explore how cooperation, what Kropotkin called “mutual aid,” was “a factor in evolution.” The issue at hand bears some similarity to a debate going back to the mid-19th century between Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon was a utopian socialist and the father of modern anarchism. Proudhon believed that a new, post-capitalist society could be created alongside capitalism and slowly grow to the point where it became dominant. This process, he believed, could happen in a decentralized way. Marx, by contrast, judged that the capitalist state would never allow this to happen, and would attempt to destroy and undermine these forms of collective care. He argued that the state must be challenged with a fighting organization of the working class. This organized resistance can put pressure on the state and the wealthy, forcing them to provide resources that ordinary people need. But, for Marx, a better society could only come when our forms of organization were strong enough to directly confront the state and replace it with something better. What’s at stake today is something similar. While acts of solidarity and mutual aid organizations are extremely important, there are limits to what they can achieve inside capitalist society. Organized solidarity entails not just sharing our limited resources between ourselves, but fighting to take them from the rich, whether directly, or indirectly through political demands on the capitalist state. In order for this to be a political movement, and not just a form of charity, organized acts of solidarity and demands on the state need to be made in ways that build class consciousness and organization. Many socialists have taken on the language and strategy of mutual aid wholesale. In doing so they have unconsciously adopted an anarchist theory of social change and the state. The anarchist theory argues that placing demands on the state only recognizes its authority, strengthens it, and weakens the workers’ movement. Revolutionary socialists, by contrast, share the anarchist opposition to the capitalist state, but think the anarchist approach of ignoring or attempting to circumvent the state is wrong. We believe that the organized working class must engage with and make demands upon the state, while avoiding the social democratic trap of working exclusively through the state, and relying on its reforms. Workers can only achieve a better society by building it for ourselves, brick-by-brick, from the bottom up. For instance, revolutionary socialists, anarchists, and social democrats can work together with tenants in supporting realistic rent strikes during this time of mass unemployment, and mutual defense against evictions—sometimes cited as a form of mutual aid. But it is also a political act to extend these pressures to demands on the state for a blanket end to evictions, and for rent and mortgage cancellation or moratoriums. Mutual aid and class struggle at work “Occupy Sandy” provides a revealing illustration of the merits and limitations of mutual aid work. During the hurricane, a number of New York activists previously involved with “Occupy Wall Street” organized themselves into “Occupy Sandy” around a politics of “mutual aid, not charity.” The group was involved in a lot of important work and provided crucial help to people who were impacted by the storm. However, the political distinction between mutual aid and charity was not always clear to those giving or receiving aid. And despite all its impressive efforts, getting the electricity back on and the subways running ultimately depended upon the state. When the crisis ended, the group left no form of organization behind. The scale of the crisis today is orders of magnitude larger than it was during the hurricane in 2012, and a much larger portion of the working class has been impacted. The government is currently spending trillions of dollars to prop up banks and corporations. Working people, who create all the wealth in society, need to be getting a share of that. We need to develop strategies that not only spread our limited resources around, but reappropriate what the wealthy have taken from us. Labor unions, where working people are organized and have leverage against the bosses and corporations, are crucial in the battle for wealth redistribution. An illustrative example comes from the experience of workers in the airline industry. The recent bailout provided the industry with $75 billion. When workers learned this was happening, they organized to ensure that this money would go to help workers and their families get through the crisis. The Flight Attendants Association, led by Sara Nelson, was able to force the airlines into setting aside $29 billion for their workers. This will help pay salaries through the end of September. In a commendable display of solidarity, the union fought for a portion of this aid to go to airport workers as well. The airline workers displayed a willingness to use their power to secure what they needed from their employers. More union actions like this—especially if they were to include greater direct involvement from rank-and-file airline workers—could not only win important material gains, but would also strengthen working class self-organization for future battles against the state and corporations. Combative social movements will get us the goods In order to be effective, resistance cannot be the province of a revolutionary minority alone. Since capitalism is creative to the same degree that it is destructive, it tends to breed resistance among people of all walks of life — revolutionary and non-revolutionary alike. It is the role of revolutionaries not to take over these movements, but to intervene and fight alongside those affected in order to win them over to revolutionary politics. Mutual aid networks can be a starting point for people who are radicalizing, but they are most effective when connected to wider movements for change, not seen as an end unto themselves. We need to build social movements that strive not only to redistribute the few resources available to us, but which also work to reappropriate from the rich the wealth they have taken from us. These movements can translate material pressure into material resources for the majority. They can secure concessions such as medicare-for-all and the inclusion of the undocumented in government aid programs. Bernie Sanders had proposed $2,000 per month for everyone for the duration of the crisis. This is a proposal that combative mass social movements could have the power to actually secure. Organization, defined as mass involvement, solidarity, and unity-in-action toward a common goal, is the only tool that can give us enough power to take on capital and the state. Without it, we risk just papering over the cracks in capitalism. Only with this tool can we move toward a society based not upon mindless profit for a few, but upon meeting the needs of all. This will allow us to eliminate the conditions that make mutual aid groups necessary, and construct a society based upon solidarity.

#### Neoliberal capitalism has conditioned us to reject the state as a site of social struggle and transformation---our response to the pandemic and accelerating economic collapse should affirm mass mobilization for a social and political system that provides for the needs of all without requiring band-aid strategies like mutual aid

Noam Sandweiss-Back 20, Program Coordinator at the Kairos Center for Religions, Rights, and Social Justice, 2020, “Beyond Mutual Aid: Toward the Poor Organizing the Poor,” https://kairoscenter.org/beyond-mutual-aid/

In the early months of the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover was fond of saying that “prosperity is just around the corner.” At the same time, millions were losing their jobs, facing utility shut offs and evictions, moving into tent encampments and shantytowns, and standing in bread lines that stretched for hours. In 1929 there was no public social safety net or welfare programs, not even as we know them in their fractured form today. Instead, the state’s response was to attend to Wall Street and direct the poor and newly-dispossessed toward a patchwork and intolerant system of private relief agencies and religious aid organizations. Denying the government had any larger responsibility for its people, Hoover would later explain that “the basis of successful relief in national distress is to mobilize…agencies of relief help in the community. This has been the American way.”

Abandoned and left to fend for themselves from the scraps of a system of charity, many among the ranks of the poor took survival into their own hands. They marched in unprecedented numbers against hunger and unemployment, led daring wildcat strikes and other militant actions from industrial plants in the Midwest to tenant farms in the Delta, and created mass organizations like the Unemployed Councils, formed through the Communist Party. These multi-racial Councils developed in cities across the country around relief for unemployed workers, preventing or reversing thousands of evictions and gas and electricity shutoffs, among other activities. They worked locally to address their immediate, overflowing needs, but in the early years of the Great Depression they also became a political home for tens of thousands of poor people: central to the Councils’ vision was political education, leadership development, and larger forms of collective agitation and struggle.

Just a few years later, the Social Security Act and other major government programs were created. This history is often told crediting Franklin D. Roosevelt and a handful of supposedly transcendent politicians, but it was the collective efforts of masses of people that forced the government into action. Roosevelt himself did not have dreams of fundamental change for the poor and, by the end of the 1930s, the New Deal became a constrained political project that saved American capitalism from itself. The significant public concessions that it did make were instead the result of poor people taking action together.

Today, we confront another economic collapse amid a vicious pandemic. In the last six weeks, we’ve witnessed the accelerated redistribution of wealth from the poor to the most rich. The government has funneled trillions of dollars into Wall Street, while the recent stimulus packages still don’t provide tens of millions of people with paid sick leave, sustained financial support, healthcare and housing protections, and more. These millions are now lining up behind the 140 million who were already poor or one emergency away from poverty.

This multitude must protect themselves and their communities in the shadow of a government that has abandoned them in ways that strikingly echo the Hoover administration. Within this context, many have turned to the idea of mutual aid. Community groups and ad-hoc neighborhood associations are springing up to coordinate the sharing of food and supplies; nonprofits are funneling their shrinking budgets toward direct service projects; online organizations are offering virtual trainings; even Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has shared a “how-to” guide on the subject.

The lengths to which people are laboring to take care of one another during this crisis is inspiring and necessary. All across the country, we are seeing the truth: that poor and dispossessed people, as well as all those now awakened to a new kind of precarity, will not wait to be saved, but will, as always, take lifesaving action born out of necessity. As long as this crisis rages, there will be people who do the necessary work of triage, of meeting immediate needs in the present, and this work is critical. But in the face of a brutal and increasingly volatile system, mutual aid as it is generally being conceived may be a bandaid, rather than a strategy to win what every person needs in order to live.

For many concerned citizens, the response to this moment has been to emulate a non-profit service model for those most at risk. This is a position of stop-gap charity that takes care of a small number of people, but does little to address the deeper source of pain for so many. For others, mutual aid has become a project of rejecting and resisting the state and its decrepit and hateful institutions; this is a posture that claims that no one is coming to save us, that our communities have all that we need, and that we can somehow transform our conditions by coming together through networks of social solidarity. In both cases, good people are doing brave work and some are receiving emergency relief because of it. But mutual aid at this level makes no claim on the state and no counterattack toward capital to solve the problem of this pandemic and the economic crisis beneath it.

Over the past fifty years, the ruling class has mounted devastating attacks on public institutions and services, from privatized healthcare and education to the evisceration of the social safety net. Meanwhile, the economy has undergone a technological revolution, and with it our society has been (re)constructed in the image of global capital. We’ve seen the hollowing out of the state and the forfeiture of many of its functions to non-profits, the private sector, and the free market. We’ve been made increasingly dependent on market-based solutions that lionize billionaires and trumpet apolitical acts of service.

Now, in this moment of crisis, we do what we can to salvage our communities, often using the same models, while corporations are celebrated for their humanitarianism even as they reap the rewards of federal relief. Neoliberal capitalism and decades of austerity measures have conditioned generations of us to ignore or lose faith in the possibility of the state as a site for organized struggle. But it will take the resources of our government and of governments around the world to not only overcome the coronavirus, but to fundamentally change our lives for the better.

### 1NC---Defense

#### The fundamental question of this debate is the mechanism by which the aff builds power---all political actions are defined by their relationships to contingent material networks of state resources and political relations, which can be reallocated by the combination of action both within and against the state---but that requires explicit material strategies at the outset, rather than horizontalism

Dylan Taylor 17, Lecturer, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, *Social Movements and Democracy in the 21st Century*, 2017, pp. 228-234

A shortcoming of the theorists considered in Chap. 5 is the insufficient attention paid to the state; this reflects, to a degree, the rejection of the (communist) party. With the party spurned, attention moved primarily to social movements, as the state was no longer viewed as the principal avenue through which to pursue change. The shortcomings of contemporary activism highlight the need to restore consideration of the state as a conceptual variable. As argued in Chap. 4 , the state has continued to be a major actor in the neoliberal era (despite the reigning doxa). Poulantzas (see also 1978 , pp. 22–24; ibid, p. 17) held that the state is always involved in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production which, under capitalism, are necessarily exploitative. To understand the capitalist state involves appreciating the conflict of interests present within capitalist relations of production and, by extension, how class struggle is present within these power relations (ibid. p. 25). Social struggle between classes is a “game of provisional compromise” played on an unstable field (ibid, 141)—policies always reflect the outcome of strategic compromises (Levine 2002 , p. 176). Struggle occurs between capital and the masses, and also within capital itself (Poulantzas 1980 , p. 143). The capitalist state needs to represent the long-term interests of the whole of the bourgeoisie, but does so under the hegemony of one of its factions (ibid, p. 307). The State organises and reproduces class hegemony by establishing a veritable field of compromises between the dominant and dominated classes; quite frequently, this will even involve the imposition of certain short-term material sacrifi ces on the dominant classes, in order that their long-term domination may be reproduced. … It should never be forgotten that a whole series of economic measures, particularly concerning the expanded reproduction of labour-power, were imposed on the State by the struggle of the dominated classes . (ibid, p. 184, emphasis in original) Th e state is able to secure the long-run hegemony of the capitalist class by granting certain material demands to the popular masses. Th ese may, at the time, be quite radical in their import, such as the provision of universal healthcare or education—but with a change to the relations of force in favour of the bourgeoisie, such demands can be covertly stripped of their radical content (ibid. p. 185). An example is the privatisation of public assets in recent years (as argued in Chap. 4 ). The granting of material demands to the public is increasingly taking place through the private sector, reflecting the decline of popular demands aimed at the state following the defeat of organised labour. The means of aligning factions of the working class with bourgeois projects has (as explored in Chap. 4 ) involved tying them into financial markets through their pension funds and access to easy credit. The bailout of financial markets by the state (a move overwhelmingly in the interests of the capitalist class) could, consequently, be justified to sections of the working class on the basis that it protected their assets. The play of compromise, of give and take, which takes place under the auspices of the state means “the precise configuration of the ensemble of state apparatuses … depends not only on the internal relation of force in the power bloc but also on the role they fulfil in respect to the dominated classes” (Poulantzas 2008 , p. 311)—a position signalling Poulantzas’ debt to Gramsci ( 1971 , p. 182), who had argued that the interests of the … dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria … between the interests of the fundamental group and those of subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point. The state, then, needs to be seen as a relation of forces—it is the material condensation of the struggle that takes place among classes (Poulantzas 1980 , pp. 128–29). No one class ever has complete control of all state institutions (Bratsis 2002 , p. 259). The state is constituted through, and riven with, class contradictions. It must not, therefore, be seen as monolithic (this being the shortcoming of Badiou’s approach to the state, as explored in Chap. 5 )—class contradictions are present within the state’s material framework and patterns of organisation (Poulantzas 1980 , p. 134). The rigidity of the state ensures that its manipulation at the hands of the bourgeois is a slow process (ibid, p. 138). Rather than assuming a position that works only against the state, as Badiou and Rancière advocate, it needs to be realised that the state, while rigid, can be subject to change from within. To illustrate the unfixed nature of the state Poulantzas (ibid, pp. 146–47) offers a “relational theory of power” as a means of explaining (primarily class) struggle. Power, he argues, is not a quantity or object; nor is it an essence, or substance, possessed by a dominant class. Insofar as power can be held by social classes, it … should be understood as the capacity of one or several classes to realise their specific interests. It is a concept designating the field of their struggle— that of the relationship of forces and of the relations between one class and another. … Th e capacity of one class to realise its interests is in opposition to the capacity (and interests) of other classes: the field of power is therefore strictly relational. (ibid, p. 147, emphasis in original) The power of a class is positional 1 —it stems from its objective place in political, economic and ideological relations. Each class’ position, and the degree of power stemming from holding this position, is delimited by other classes and/or class fractions. “Power … depends on, and springs from, a relational system of material places occupied by particular agents” (ibid, p. 147). State power, then, has no intrinsic essence but is rather the relations of social classes and forces. The state itself is the “strategic site of organisation of the dominant class in its relationship with dominated classes” (ibid, p. 148). In assessing the state today it can be seen that the interests of the capitalist class are paramount, free as they are from any concerted countervailing pressures—history shows this is not an inevitable arrangement. The relationship between the dominant and dominated classes is never straightforward. As the state is a field of strategic relations, power needs to be seen as mobile, as moving between apparatuses. Different state institutions house competing/rival class (or other) social relations (Levine 2002 , p. 176). Strategically the question must always be asked “who is in power to do what?” Th e state needs to be comprehended as a complex with higher (ruling) levels and subordinate levels. The aim of Marxist political analysis is to identify the sites within this complex where real power is concentrated—with “real power” denoting, here, the institutional resources (administration, executive power, budget) which allow the social class in power to maintain their superior position within political struggles (Codato and Perissinotto 2002 , p. 61): prime examples being the Federal Reserve or central banks which are, essentially, autonomous institutions, insulated from popular demands, or the appointment and tenure of Supreme Court judges. There are, however, always opportunities to tip the balance of powers one way or another—something Occupy, with its spurning of the state, failed to take into account. If there is no concerted opposition to capitalist rule, then practices seeking to maintain social cohesion will adhere exclusively to the interests of the capitalist class—a disorganised working class poses no threat to the stability of this class: “Although capital may indeed be able to adjust to the various working-class concessions and even to an expansion in social-welfare policies, there is no need to do so without a challenge coming from below” (Levine 2002 , p. 181). Although the key strategic points within the state are occupied by those who seek to perpetuate capitalism, it would be a mistake, argues Poulantzas ( 1980 , p. 153, emphasis in original), to cease conducting struggles within the strategic field of the state: We … know that, alongside their possible presence in the physical space of the state apparatuses, the popular masses must constantly maintain and deploy centres and networks at a distance from these apparatuses: I am referring, of course, to movements for direct, rank-and-fi le democracy and to self-management networks. But although these take up political objectives, they are not located outside the State or, in any case, outside power— contrary to the simplistic illusions of anti-institutional purity. What is more, to place oneself at any cost outside the State in the thought that one is thereby situated outside power (which is impossible) can often be the best means of leaving the field open for statism : in short, it often involves a retreat in the face of the enemy precisely on this strategically crucial terrain. The crucial point here is that there is no “outside” of the state to which movements can escape—positions can be assumed against the state by movements, but these need to be matched by actions within the field of the state by actors from the left. In conceptualising how this might be possible Poulantzas (ibid, p. 256, emphasis in original) sought to pose the question of democratic socialism anew: How is it possible to radically transform the state in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy (which were all a conquest of the popular masses) are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of selfmanagement bodies? In seeking an answer to this question it is important, he cautions, not to follow the “old illusion of anarchism” that the strategic field of the state can be abandoned. Political strategy must be grounded in the “autonomy of the organisations of the popular masses,” but their autonomy is not founded in some “outside” space. Th e popular masses, he argues, can deploy networks and centres of struggle at a distance from state apparatuses, but never from outside the state (ibid, p. 153). Th ere can be no simple opposition between “internal” and “external” struggle; rather, both must be simultaneously pursued (ibid, p. 260). Successful strategy entails maintaining a distance from the state (without imagining an outside), combined with taking action within the state to transform the state (Th omas 2002 , p. 76).

#### Engaging with state politics is key to prevent imminent acts of violence---this tactical usage doesn’t result in cooption.

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In effect, the pertinence of hegemonic logics for an effective self-organization of the multitude is conceded by the very advocates of non-hegemonic multitudinous politics, Hardt and Negri, in their latest Declaration (2012). Sketching the outlines of a constituent process that can advance the common freedom of the many today, they reasonably ask (Hardt and Negri 2012: 56): 'What good is a beautiful constituent process when people are suffering now? What if, by the time we create a perfect democratic society, the earth is already degraded beyond repair?' Any constituent powers must be equipped with a host of democratic 'counterpowers' that will take immediate action in various areas of urgent need in order to ward off environmental degradation and to address basic human necessities (food, shelter, health etc.). To this end, the counterpowers will deploy the legal means of national and international law, as well as 'weapons of coercion' so as to 'force the corporations and the nation-states to open access to the common' and to stop natural and social destruction (Hardt and Negri 2012: 59). In their conclusion (Hardt and Negri 2012: 101-3), they vociferously acknowledge, moreover, that the rich will not give away their property and the powerful will not let the reins of power fall of their own free will. To overturn the ruling powers we will need force, and we should prepare for an event that will 'completely reshuffle the decks of political powers and possibility' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 102). In other words, what is required is a new balance of power that can be attained through the forceful assertion of the multitude in an event of rupture. And this refiguring of the plexus of power lies at the core of any hegemonic demarche on its most classic, Gramscian conception (Gramsci 1971: 57-8, 109, 172, 404).4 Moreover, a democratic society grounded in the open sharing and self¬management of the 'commons' will need to forge coalitions between the defenders of such a project and a variety of groups in struggle - workers, unemployed, poor, students, people opposing racial and gender hierarchies (Hardt and Negri 2012: 106--7). Furthermore, such blocs of forces should not come together as a tactical alliance of separate identities and organizations, but they should build alliances in which autonomous singularities interact with each other, transform themselves through their exchanges, draw inspiration from one another and recognize themselves as 'part of a common project' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 107). That is, the logic of difference should be supplemented with a logic of equivalence which unfolds around a common identity, in Laclau's terms, and forms a community of passion and understanding, in Gramsci's account (1971: 333,418). 4 Antonio Negri has explicitly affirmed the need for a 'hegemony of one pole' - 'the common of the multitude' - 'that has been subordinated over another which has been dominant until now' (Curcio and Ozselcuk 2010: 322). Finally, Hardt and Negri (2012: 82-3) single out a certain dialectic between movements and recent 'progressive governments' in Latin America and foreground it as an exemplary instance of an 'institutionality of the common'. Democratic decision-making practices direct here plural processes of transparent and flexible governance, allying effective counterpowers with autonomous, long-term political developments and the ethico-political elaboration of a new democratic constitution. In this paradigmatic apparatus of open, plural and egalitarian self-government, radical movements hold on to their organizational and ideological autonomy. They maintain co-operative and antagonistic relations with governments which support programmatically the same project and form part of the same system of common governance. They conduct common battles against various hierarchies but they turn against state administrations and ruling parties that claim to represent them when the latter relapse into old practices of domination. This mode of disjunctive conjunction between movements and parties¬governments may indeed mark a radical break with the hegemonic, socialist or populist, subsumption of social movements under a centralized party with ideological homogeneity (Hardt and Negri 2012: 81, 83). However, even though such an agonistic interaction dilutes sovereign power into a complex plurality of deliberative moments and consensual law-making initiatives, it is said to preserve 'nonetheless a deep political coherence of the governmental process' which establishes a consistent 'institutionality of the common' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 82). If this is so, the government must partly represent in the state the interests and political orientations of the social movements, otherwise the 'deep coherence' of governance would be a sham. In other words, representation remains intrinsic to this modality of political rule, which seeks to exert the hegemonic power of an allied historic bloc over other social forces insofar it wages a common battle 'against national oligarchies, international corporations, or racist elites' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 81-2). By the same token, the disjunctive alliance of movements and ruling parties is yet another incarnation of the hegemonic dialectic between universality and particularity. The entire bloc that enacts the 'institutionality of the common' does not coincide with society as a whole to the extent that it wields its power against opposing social forces. Accordingly, it stands for a particularity which assumes the role of universality (of the 'common') without encompassing the whole in its entirety. Laclau's 'uneven power', 'logic of equivalence', 'representation' and the dialectic of 'particularity/universality' are alive and kicking amidst the constituent politics of the multitude. Beyond the figure of an emancipatory, egalitarian and internally diverse multitude as canvassed by Hardt and Negri and beyond the schemes of social mobilization and self-government as adumbrated in actual mobilizations, it seems that at least three dimensions of hegemonic politics should be upheld in contemporary movements which strive for the construction of autonomous and equal associations. On the reasonable assumption that entrenched interests, plutocrats and established oligarchies will not forsake voluntarily their power, their property and their privileges, it will be necessary, first, to pursue hegemony as a struggle to reconfigure the existing composition of forces and to replace it with a different power structure that will strain to minimize domination, hierarchies and exclusions. Residues of uneven, centralized power might also subsist within the collective self-administration of the commons, as in the example of open source communities. The effective management of the codes which are freely accessible to all combines the voluntary contributions of a potentially unlimited community of users evincing variable degrees of experience and interest with a committed core of key developers who responsibly oversee the process of developing a prominent version of the code (Ljungberg 2000, Valverde and Sole 2007, Leadbeater 2009). Second, even if one envisages freer, plural and egalitarian worlds, and the struggles to realize them, in terms of multiple interlocking and conflicting assemblages, rather than as a global system or a united revolutionary front, a variable degree of hegemony as collective unity-cohesion will be still needed to avoid mutually destructive collisions and incompatibilities. This would be redundant only if social and individual differences cohered spontaneously with each other, and ruinous conflicts could be magically averted without much effort. Third, relations of representation and the dialectics of particularity/universal, whereby a particular force takes on universal tasks and speaks in the name of the whole, will be reproduced in any association in which the will of the many does not coincide with the will of all. Such a congruence is not logically inconceivable, but it is empirically unlikely in societies of free, diverse and self-differentiating singularities where no universal reason, nature or homogeneous tradition guarantees the collective convergence of different understandings, values and pursuits in political interactions. However, even if it displays the formal traits of unequal power, unification and representation, a contemporary hegemony of self-organized multiplicities of singularities will break through many in egalitarian, heteronomous and oppressive fixations of hegemony in Gramsci's and Laclau's guise, subverting hegemonic politics from within and without. Let us begin with vertical, uneven power relations. Against the ruling force of a party guided by 'generals' (Gramsci 1971: 153), against the cohesive function of leaders and near-autonomous representatives, and against the sheer emphasis on the need for power asymmetries (Laclau 1996: 43, 54-7, 2000: 207-12), the egalitarian politics of the many seeks today a horizontal, non-hierarchical collective organization in networks that foster the equal participation of all, dismissing party bureaucracies, leaders and top-down representation. The potential persistence or re-emergence of hierarchies and relations of domination due to unequal capabilities, and the eventual failure to achieve a violence-free consensus should not be seen as a fatal condition to which we should resign ourselves. They should be regarded, rather, as an always present risk and possibility against which free collectives should raise awareness and institute various procedures of contest and struggle, striving for the maximum possible degree of equal freedom. Variable forms of centralization could be endorsed by autonomous multiplicities, such as general assemblies which coordinate many smaller assemblies and diverse mobilizations, or groups of committed participants in open collective processes that manage common resources in close exchange with the wider communities which they serve. There can be variable hybridizations of verticality, concentration and horizontality in open egalitarian multitudes. But the prevalent presumption will be against closures, hierarchies and leaders, and there should be a permanent movement in favour of opening access and equalizing power in effective practices of collective self-governance. To the extent that asymmetries of power are always likely to crop up again, or insofar as they may be pertinent and expedient under particular conditions, full horizontality cannot be a permanent state but an horizon of ongoing struggle against residues of uneven, top-down and concentrated power. Egalitarian multitudes will embody then disjunctive combinations of horizontality and verticality, whereby each will blend uneasily with the other, mutually contesting and redressing their limitations. But universally open participation and symmetrical power will be ranked higher in the order of priorities. The pursuit of direct democracy for all, the struggle against sovereign leaders and the expansion of active engagement in collective self-governance are found at the cutting edge of contemporary democratic movements, while they are ostensibly lacking in hegemonic politics a la Gramsci and Laclau. Uneven power will have to be wielded against the opponents of a radical democracy of the multitudes, both during the struggles to establish it and in order to sustain and enhance it thereafter. But the enemies of equal and plural self-organization will be the defenders of vested interests, hierarchies and exclusions, that is, collective power will be used against the agents of domination. Forceful 'counterpowers' will need to be deployed against obdurate elites for the common re-appropriation of the commons and for arresting natural degradation. But no sovereign power should enforce its schemes of egalitarian self-management on dissidents and unwilling others, as this runs counter to the very idea of autonomous self-organization. And any processes of sovereign rule within egalitiarian multiplicities will endeavour to disperse, pluralize and dilute sovereignty among various sites of collective governance, seeking consensus and negotiation among fairly equal parties rather than the concentration of force around some of them. Moving on to the unity of the hegemonic bloc - its mode of composition - the affirmation of diversity and autonomous constituent practices in the 'newest social movements' (Day 2005) suggests a principle of unity that clashes head-on with Gramsci's intellectual, moral, political and economic homogeneity imposed on the whole by leading groups and the state (1971: 152-3, 181-2, 239,244,266,333,418). The new principle of free and egalitarian pluralization in the modes of association, in participatory economies and so on is encapsulated in a famous saying of the Zapatistas: 'One no, many yeses': one no to the global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, many yeses to the figures of free and equal societies we want to create in different parts of the world. The need for cohesion and the commitment to equal freedom will set limits to the scope of possible and acceptable diversity. But the ultimate bounds will not be fully settled in advance and the aim will be to accommodate the maximum degree of willed collective divergences, beyond any universal orthodoxy or any forceful imposition of 'ideal freedom'. The composition of differences will not be dictated by abstract, a priori laws. It will be shaped through the intercourse, conflict and participation of all societies of freedom that interact in the same network of extended relations. This will negotiate a flexible unity of praxis rather than a rigid unity of ideology or a fixed universal constitution. In the insurrections of the indignados and the OWS, collective identity was not rooted in a common ideology or a fixed political program. It was constantly produced through communication and engagement in a political process which sought to agglutinate differences and to attain provisional agreement on common or parallel actions. In such practices of collective deliberation, difference is not a given that can only be aggregated with other prefixed preferences; differences are dynamic divergences which can be redefined and may find new points of convergence. They proceed together under the common banners of quasi-empty signifiers such as 'Real democracy' or 'We are the 99%', which are variously signifiable by different actors and remain subject to ongoing re-signification through continuous political interaction. These common signifiers do not function as the war flags of party generals who seek to recruit more soldiers to their struggle for hegemony, pursuing their set plans. Finally, representation and leadership by 'representatives'. This is another constitutive structure of hegemony which is radically upset and reconfigured in multitudinous militancy today. True, the 'activist minorities' which set up encampments in the Mediterranean central squares and, later on, in North America spoke in the name of the 'people' or the 99 per cent, although they fell far short of a popular majority. But this modality of representation shares very little with instituted forms of political representation in liberal democracies. Representatives do not make up a closed elite club nor do they set themselves apart from society, yielding sovereign power over those they are supposed to represent. The mobilized minorities in question open sites of collective involvement and political deliberation, which offer access to any and all on equal terms. The general assemblies in the encampments functioned as common pools of collective self-management which were freely available to all, without any fixed leadership and exclusionary formal rules. In their capacity as collective representatives, these assemblies make representation accessible to the active engagement and the widening influence of the 'represented' - the broader society or the people that they stand for. They depersonalize representation, whose function is assumed by anonymous, mobile and shifting crowds. As a result, no individual representatives are vested with formally entrenched sovereign powers and any citizen can get involved in the process. The 'leadership' that could be exercised by such movements over society is not only collective but also receptive to all, participatory, mutable and reversible, staging a singular marriage of representative with direct democracy. Alain Badiou (2012: 58-62) has argued that militant collective mobilizations which occupy public sites display an intensification of subjective energy. They make the 'people' publicly present and they proclaim universal political 'truths' ('real democracy now', 'we are all free and equal', and so on). But they are always minoritarian compared to the silent, inert majorities of abstaining individuals in the various societies in which they surge up. However, their intensity and their localized, compact presence make them certain that they represent the country's people as a whole, so much so that nobody can publicly deny it. The totality is represented by 'contraction', and the activist minority 'possess an accepted authority to proclaim that the historical destiny of the country . . . is them' (Badiou 2012: 60), rendering all questions of adequate representation irrelevant. This claim may have some merit when it comes to short-term, high-intensity collective politics. But it is deeply controversial as a general tack to grass¬roots egalitarian self-government, insofar as it has an activist, anonymous and unaccountable minority rule over a silent and absent majority. Indeed, a standing commitment to full political engagement in all the fields of the 'commons' (technical infrastructures, natural resources, culture, common affairs at large) is hardly imaginable for the vast majority in the long run. But the challenge we are facing is to bind together the energetic and direct democratic 'contraction' of the people with political processes of accountability and institutional control by society at large. Through such procedures, the dismantling of alienated sovereign representation and the institution of assemblies of collective self-governance open to all could be coupled with circuits of communication and answerability to social majorities, preventing the rise of new elites of committed activists and fomenting political fermentation, exchange, contest and variable degrees of participation across wider swathes of the population. In this way, a political association of the multitude could not only come to grips with residues of hegemonic politics in its midst. It could also fuel the relentless subversion of hierarchies, closures and new patterns of domination from within, holding out the prospect of a world beyond hegemony in a universe still bridled with it.

#### Debating about specific policy options is the only way to meaningfully shift public policy for persons with disabilities ⁠— the aff merely points out causes of oppression without focusing on the details of potential policy responses

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Each of these developments has a connection to public policy. Technological innovation and utilization can be demanded, subsidized, discouraged, or outlawed by the state. The same is true of sorting and ASL training. To date, U.S. policy has been relatively decentralized. Neither cochlear implants nor genetic screening is mandated or heavily regulated in terms of the reasons for use. Gallaudet was chartered by the federal government and state law imposes some restrictions on the creation of new municipalities, yet these sorting efforts are largely the product of private choices. With strong enough justifications and political forces, public policy might shift. Society might begin to treat genetic screening and cochlear implants as morally questionable and unjustifiably stigmatizing for the current generation of deaf people, or [\*1275] it might invest more resources in nonverbal communication methods including ASL, or it might heavily subsidize signing communities. Moving policy in the opposite direction is equally possible in theoretical terms. A collective decision might be made to hasten the elimination of deafness-related genes, or to mainstream all deaf people and discourage ASL as inappropriately separatist. The question is whether the social model can underwrite any policy, in any direction. The answer is no: the model suggests causes of disadvantage, but what we do about it is a matter of contested norms. Opposition to social restructuring as a remedy for disability need not be the product of ignorance, insensitivity, false consciousness, or political immorality. It might be an understandable reaction within a coherent normative framework. There just is no necessary connection between causes of harm (or disadvantage) and remedies for harm (or disadvantage). This simple point can be confirmed by comparing similar situations in which an individual is not the sole cause of his or her disadvantage, and yet it is at least debatable (1) whether any remedy is justified or (2) which remedy is proper. Consider the following statements. Your inability to get through this door is caused by the confluence of more than one factor: 1. You murdered your husband to collect insurance proceeds, and because of that we prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned you. 2. Your skin is relatively dark, our customers prefer to interact with pink-skinned people, and so we did not hire you. 3. You are Catholic, we hate Catholics, and so we did not hire you. 4. You became wheelchair-bound after negligently driving a motorcycle, and we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance. 5. Your genes do not allow you to walk, your parents did not genetically screen for such embryos, you now use a wheelchair, and we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance. Each of these statements has a similar logical structure, and that structure mimics the social model of disability. Choices or practices of the broader society are disadvantaging the subject of the statements. But we can be confident that almost no one will demand social change and liberation of the subject in all of the above examples. Take statement 1. The subject is deprived of liberty by a physical barrier (her cell door) not only because of her decision to kill her husband (we might say she has the trait of spouse killer), but also because institutional forces responded in a particular way (officers of the state engaged in apprehension, prosecution, imprisonment). They need not [\*1276] have been designed to respond that way or exercised their powers in this case. But they were and they did. Very few observers will object to the social response. Assuming accurate adjudication of guilt, no affirmative defense, defensible sentencing, and so on, no plausible normative theory dictates any liberating remedy for the killer. Statements 2 and 3 prompt different normative reactions. Like statement 1, these situations involve a subject who suffers on account of a social or institutional reaction to an individual trait. There is nothing natural and immutable about pinker skinned people preferring not to interact with darker skinned people, or non-Catholics hating Catholics -- it might not have been a foreordained biological or social development that the pink/dark skin or Catholic/non-Catholic distinctions came about, or that given the distinction people would have the opportunity to interact across those categories. In any event, statements 2 and 3 involve animus or irrational distinctions between people. Statement 2 describes a business decision that is derivative of indefensible social preferences, but the engine of discrimination in those statements is basically the same. If we agree that the traits of skin color and Catholicism are unjustifiable bases for economic outcomes, and that social or institutional practices should be changed rather than those who suffer from the practices, a particular remedy must be selected. And there is room for debate. One might prefer antidiscrimination regulation and litigation over subsidies and public education campaigns (or vice versa), or one might hope that marketplace competition will take care of the problem. But we should perceive a structural similarity among statements 1, 2, and 3 without making anything like the same normative commitment to remedy the identified disadvantages. At a minimum it should be accepted that a normative framework is mediating a logical gap between causes of disadvantage and the appropriate response. Finally, consider statements 4 and 5. They are variations on the example nearly always used to illustrate the social model. Here the disadvantage involves a trait that impairs the ability to move by walking in conjunction with the architectural preference of others for stairs. By now, the setup has a familiar form. It is possible to draw a normative distinction between the two statements. One might believe the subject in statement 4 is morally responsible for his impairment, or that society should be careful about awarding remedies where it might reduce incentives to be careful. Either position militates against a legal remedy without necessarily deciding the outcome in statement 5. That situation effectively removes responsibility for the relevant impairment from the subject, while highlighting the possibility that third parties (here, the parents) could have taken steps to prevent producing a child with the impairment. Perhaps that fact will influence the [\*1277] choice between reconstructing the environment we have been left with and engineering the human beings we create. Even if the parents' opportunity is irrelevant to the policy response, there is still the issue of cost. Is it justifiable to retrofit the building in light of scarce resources and other needs? Should obligations of social restructuring only apply going forward? What is the correct timeframe within which to answer these questions? This choice might be much more difficult than the issue of murder for cash in statement 1; but there is a choice to be made, and it is irreducibly normative in a way that cannot be solved by enhancing the accuracy of our causation portrait. All of this applies to the Deaf culture controversies. At least part of any disadvantage associated with deafness fits the social model. Lack of hearing can be inhibiting when others communicate with the spoken word. More than one response to this situation is possible: one might decide that no response is appropriate considering resource constraints, or that deaf people should have subsidized access to cochlear implants, or that genetic screening should be used to minimize the number of deaf people, or that ASL instruction should be expanded, or that deaf people should have greater opportunities to sort themselves into sign language communities -- or the opposite of any of these responses. To be sure, our country has progressed to the point where few if any will attempt to justify treating physically or mentally impaired individuals like the killer in statement 1. It is no longer so impolite to be impaired. n90 And forced segregation is less popular in the U.S. today, n91 let alone coerced sterilization. n92 But the recognition of multiple causal factors in the generation of disadvantage is not an answer to the question, "what do we do now?"

# 1NR

## DA

### 1NR---!---Turns Case

#### Turns case---war would bolster military spending and cut social and health programs that are essential for disabled folks

Ken Boulding, Philosophy PhD, 78, professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace.

#### Chinese tech is violent & promotes a surveillance state

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This international system, while not perfect, has proven to be more successful than any in human history at providing security, economic prosperity, and freedom. The evidence of this is apparent in the numbers. Before 1945, major powers frequently engaged in direct warfare on a massive scale, as in the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. Since 1945, however, there have been zero great-power wars. As shown in Figure 1, the percentage of people killed in armed conflict has drastically declined in the post-World War II era. Armed conflict killed an average of 1–2 percent of the human population from 1600 to 1945. During the Cold War, an average of 0.4 percent of the world’s population perished due to war. Since the year 2000, less than one one-hundredth of 1 percent of people have died this way.8 Under a rules-based system, the world has continued to make progress in reducing deaths from all kinds of war, including often-intractable civil conflicts.9 Turning to economic prosperity, the global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1945 was $4,079.10 Today it is $11,570.11 This drastic increase in global living standards is evident in Figure 2. The share of the global population living in poverty has dramatically decreased. In 1929, the number of people living in extreme poverty (defined as earning less than 1.90 international dollars per day) was 1.35 billion, almost two-thirds of the world population at the time. In 2015, that figure was 733.48 million, or slightly less than 10 percent of the world population.12 China itself has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of this system, as geopolitical stability in Asia and integration into the global economy helped to lift four hundred million Chinese out of poverty. In the realm of good governance, the number of democracies has substantially increased. With the end of World War II and decolonization, the number of democracies increased from seventeen to forty-eight between 1945 and 1989.13 That number further skyrocketed at the end of the Cold War, as countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain rushed to join the West. In the year 1900, there were twelve democracies in the world. Today there are ninety-six.14 The percentage of the world’s population living under democratic governments has also increased from about 12 percent in 1900 to more than 55 percent today.15 This trend is visible in Figure 3. To be sure, these outcomes are the result of an enormous and interconnected range of factors. International-relations scholars, for example, believe that nuclear deterrence and the absence of a multipolar distribution of power also contributed to great-power peace.16 In addition, globalization and economic development have been fueled by new technological developments. Further, global norms on democratic governance and human rights have come a long way since the early twentieth century.17 Still, it is doubtful whether this dramatic improvement in the human condition could have been achieved in the absence of the rules-based international system. Moreover, many of these other driving forces are themselves constitutive of, if not partially the result of, that system. Global bipolarity, and then unipolarity with the United States at its center, was critical for the postwar development of a rules-based system, which may not have been possible in a more multipolar distribution of international power, or with a non-democratic hegemon at the system’s apex. The splitting of the atom could have resulted in widespread nuclear-weapons proliferation and nuclear use had it not been for the NPT and extended US nuclear deterrence in Europe and Asia.18 The most important technological advances for globalization, including the Internet, occurred and flourished in the free world, defended by the United States and its democratic allies and partners.19 Finally, the United States and its democratic partners, along with nongovernmental organizations and individuals operating in these states, were the most important norm entrepreneurs propagating global norms around issues of good governance, democracy, and human rights. In sum, the rules-based international system that has been the defining feature of global order for the past seventy years has coincided with—and was almost certainly essential in bringing about—the most secure, prosperous, and well-governed world humanity has ever known. Despite this record of unprecedented and enduring success, the rules-based international system is currently besieged by a number of challenges unleashed by rapid and dramatic global change. Understanding the current strategic context, including global trends and threats both external and internal to the system’s democratic core, is a necessary first step toward devising a strategy to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system. Global Diffusion of Power. The international distribution of power, as defined by relative economic weight, is shifting away from the founders of the post-World War II system to other emerging economies. As recently as the 1990s, nearly 70 percent of global economic activity occurred in Europe and the Americas. By the 2040s, that number is expected to drop to roughly 40 percent. At the same time, the Asian share of global GDP will increase from 32 percent at present to 53 percent in 2050, meaning that, by that time, the majority of all economic activity on Earth will occur in Asia. While the United States remains the world’s most powerful state militarily and economically, it is declining relative to other rising powers, particularly China. When corrected for purchasing-power parity (PPP), China’s GDP has already surpassed the United States. The better metric for international power and influence, however, is real GDP; here, too, the US advantage is narrowing, but more slowly.21 At the conclusion of World War II, the United States possessed roughly 50 percent of global GDP.22 From the 1970s through today, that number has held steady at roughly 25 percent.23 Despite a common misperception, the United States’ share of global power is not declining in absolute terms. Rather, other powers—especially China—are rising. China’s share of global GDP rose from 4.6 percent in the 1990s to 15 percent today.24 Many economists predict that China could surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2030. It is noteworthy, however, that in 2009, economists predicted that this transition would happen by 2020. That date has been pushed back a decade as Chinese growth has slowed. Future projections depend entirely on assumptions about growth rates in the United States and China that cannot be known with certainty. Still, most economists expect that China will, at some point, surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy. China is joined by other emerging economies with rapid growth rates, including India, Indonesia, and others. US allies, including Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, remain among the wealthiest nations on Earth, but their share of global power is also declining relative to the rise of the rest. This shift is significant because international orders function best when their formal attributes at least roughly reflect the underlying balance of power. While only one measure of global influence, economic power is central given the leverage it provides over trade and investment, and the resources it offers to sustain military and security advantages. It is also important to point out, however, that the United States and its formal treaty allies continue to possess a preponderance of power in the international system. As Figure 4 shows, the United States and its formal allies currently produce 59 percent of global GDP. When including other countries considered to be “democracies” by the widely used Polity scores, that number rises to 75 percent of global GDP. Democracies continue to retain global influence because more countries have transitioned to democracy since the end of the Cold War, and overall economic growth in democratic countries has outpaced that in autocratic states since 1991. The major shift since the dawn of the post-Cold War world, therefore, is not that the power of the United States and its democratic allies and partners has declined substantially. The major difference is that the share possessed by autocratic challengers, especially China, has grown. As Figure 4 shows, the world is approaching a more bipolar distribution of power, with more wealth concentrated in the democracies and in a grouping of autocratic challengers led by China. This means that, if they are able to work together more cohesively, the United States and its democratic allies and partners still have the power and influence necessary to significantly shape international outcomes. Moreover, if they are able to expand their ranks to court other nonaligned democracies like India, Indonesia, and Mexico, their influence on the international system can be even more decisive. Disruptive Technologies. New technologies—including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum computing, and biotech, among others—are being developed at an exponential pace, and have the promise to transform society. They will determine how people live and function in the twenty-first century, significantly shaping the global economy, international security, and the course of geopolitics. Throughout history, progress has been built on technological innovation, ranging from Thomas Edison’s light bulb to Henry Ford’s assembly line to the silicon chip, the personal computer, and the Internet. While new technology promises improved productivity and quality of life, it will bring serious downside risks, including economic dislocation and weapons proliferation. AI, for example, is already being widely adopted in the private sector to achieve great efficiencies and cost savings.25 At the same time, automation threatens to put millions out of work as jobs once performed by humans are replaced by machines. Moreover, AI is also being introduced into national militaries. A logical next step is fully autonomous weapons that can select and engage targets without a human in the decision-making loop. Some warn that these “killer robots” introduce many ethical and security risks, including the fear that they may turn on their creators and threaten humans’ very existence or, indeed, what it means to be human.26 Henry Kissinger warns, “We are in danger of losing the capacity that has been the essence of human cognition.”27 The existing international system was designed to deal with the most important dual-use technologies of the twentieth century, such as nuclear power, but it must be updated to deal with the technologies of the twenty-first century. As with nuclear energy, the international community needs an entirely new set of international norms, standards, and agreements for responsible uses of new technologies that mitigate their downside risks, while maximizing their upside potential. Since the time of Edison, the United States has been the world’s most innovative country, but it is at risk of losing that title to China and other countries that aim for the first-mover advantage in the next round of technological breakthroughs. Throughout history, technological progress and international leadership have gone hand in hand. Think of roads and aqueducts in ancient Rome, the steam engine in nineteenth-century Great Britain, and the Internet in the United States. If China or another country takes the lead in the new tech arms race, Beijing may be in a better position to rewrite the international system’s rules. Nuclear Proliferation. Even as the world grapples with the technological challenges of the twenty-first century, century-old technological challenges remain. The NPT may be the most successful treaty in history, but its future is uncertain. North Korea has become the only country in history to sign the treaty, withdraw, and build nuclear weapons. If North Korea is allowed to become an accepted nuclear-weapons state, it would pose a severe threat to international peace and security. Other members of the treaty may also reconsider their nuclear options. In particular, South Korea and Japan may be at risk of pursuing nuclear-weapons programs if the program in Pyongyang continues to advance and the United States is unwilling or unable to provide Seoul and Tokyo with adequate security assurances. Iran’s nuclear program was allowed to operate within strict limits according to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but the US withdrawal from that agreement may lead Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program or dash to achieve a nuclear weapon. A bomb in Iran could also instigate further regional nuclear proliferation.28 Officials in Saudi Arabia, for example, have declared that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Riyadh will follow suit. A proliferation cascade in East Asia or the Middle East would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and fuel regional insecurity. Moreover, new technologies such as additive manufacturing may make it easier for future proliferators to build nuclear-weapons programs, and harder for the international community to catch and stop them.29 The additional spread of a weapon that remains the ultimate instrument of military force could threaten the global security and stability necessary for the smooth functioning of the rules-based international system. Ecological Disaster. As with nuclear war, an ecological disaster could constitute a direct threat to humanity’s very existence. While states have made efforts to address climate change caused by carbon emissions, including in the Paris Climate Agreement, these steps will not be sufficient to keep emissions below the target levels set by leading scientific panels. Higher average global temperatures are leading to rising sea levels, drought, an increased frequency of violent storms, and forced migrations, all of which are threatening vulnerable societies, undermining already-weak national governments, and contributing to conflicts over natural resources.

### 1NR---AT: UQ

#### US tech sector is dominant---only antitrust crushes it

Moore 8-6-2021, MA, economics, syndicated columnist. (Stephen, "Moore: US tech sector keeps besting the world", *Boston Herald*, <https://www.bostonherald.com/2021/08/06/moore-us-tech-sector-keeps-besting-the-world/>)

Take a bow, America. It’s official and irrefutable: The U.S. is blowing out the rest of the world in tech leadership. No other country in the world comes anywhere close in tech innovation and the dominance of our made-in-America 21st-century companies. The Nasdaq index of once-small technology companies reached 15,000 last week. Only a few years ago, that index stood at 5,000. Yes, these companies have tripled in their market cap value — and that doesn’t include the dividends that have been paid out to large and mom-and-pop shareholders in America and across the planet. We are told constantly that China is catching up and achieving remarkable digital-age leaps forward in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, green energy, robotics, 5G technologies and microchips. The value of America’s 12 most valuable companies today in terms of stock valuation is well over $10 trillion. Those red, white and blue companies from Silicon Valley to the “Silicon Slopes” of Utah to Boston to northwest Arkansas are worth roughly as much as all of the Chinese publicly traded companies combined. Firms such as Google — many of which didn’t even exist 30 years ago — have made millionaires off your next-door neighbor. Ordinary people are getting rich beyond anyone’s imagination 50 years ago, thanks to American innovation and inventiveness. Risk-taking, old-fashioned can-doism is a hallmark of this unrivaled success story that has never been matched anywhere at any time in world history. Almost all of this is a tribute to American financial markets that allocate capital in hyperefficient ways. Capitalists doing a spectacular job of allocating capital efficiently is our secret sauce to financial and technological success. I am always mystified when highly successful Wall Street investors can’t explain how it is they add value and sometimes concede that they are just unnecessary middlemen. Even Warren Buffett, one of the greatest of all time, expresses guilt about his billions, as if he and other great financiers are economic parasites. No. Steering financial resources to winners like Google, not losers like Solyndra, makes everyone in America richer. Meanwhile, few politicians have any clue of how capital markets create wealth and jobs and shared prosperity in America. If they did, they would appreciate that without capitalists and capital, there is no enterprise — no material progress. They would instantly understand the economic ~~lunacy~~ of increasing taxes on capital gains and dividends, wealth taxes, and, worst of all, death taxes that threaten the future survival of family-owned businesses. Cutting, not raising, the U.S. capital gains tax would be far wiser if we want America to maintain and widen our competitive lead and keep winning globally. The arrogant fools in the administration of President Biden believe that to keep America No. 1 technologically, we need to have a multibillion-dollar government-run slush fund with the politicians picking winners and losers with other people’s money. China does this, and so does Japan, and it has never worked. One of the most famous stories of government-as-investment banker was when the Tokyo government’s brain trust recommended that Honda not get in the business of making cars. Here in the U.S., the political class has made a $150 billion bet on wind and solar power since the late 1970s, and in return, that has produced only a small sliver of our energy needs. Even more inexplicable is the movement in America coming from senators such as Democrat Elizabeth Warren on the left and Josh Hawley of Missouri on the right to break up our tech companies. Why? Because, evidently, they are too good at what they do. They make too much money. They have too many customers and too many advertisers. Put aside for a moment the rancid political persuasions of some of these leftist Silicon Valley CEOs. Somehow, the left and right agree that building a superior product and even crafting entire new industries is a punishable offense. God forbid. The rest of the world — the Chinese, Indians, Japanese and especially the technologically inferior Europeans — would love to hobble American titans and tax away their profits. The role of the U.S. government should be to repel the foreign attacks. Crazily, the Biden administration has given the green light to foreigners pillaging American companies. This doesn’t put America first. So, can America’s tech dominance continue to blow away the foreign competition for decades to come? Bet on it. That is, unless we are foolish enough to decapitate our own industries through regulation, antitrust policies and raising tax rates on success. The challenge for U.S. supremacy is coming from Washington, D.C., not China.

#### American defense innovation is peerless.

Gholz 6-24-2021, Eugene, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Harvey M. Sapolsky, Professor of Public Policy and Organization, Emeritus, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program. ("The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392>)

Here we examine these concerns that the American military advantage in the Post-Cold War era has dissipated in large part because the Defense Department lags behind in developing advanced technologies. Our judgment is that the American defense research and development system, as honed during the Cold War and expanded since, is fully capable of handling any military challenge. It is a gigantic technology-generating, innovation-producing, war-fighting machine. U.S. ‘hard’ innovation capabilities – ‘input and infrastructure factors’ like R&D facilities, human capital, access to foreign technology, and availability of funding – far outstrip those of its potential rivals, even though those factors are the ones often thought of as easier for catch-up countries to obtain.3 Despite warnings that the United States no longer spends enough on R&D and that Chinese R&D spending is surging, the reality is that the United States dramatically leads in military innovation investment. In functional terms, the United States dominates all other countries, including China, in ‘input factors,’ starting with resource allocations to defense research and development. More important, we believe that the American defense technology system is pushed toward innovation by specific contextual factors, the ‘soft’ categories of attributes and capabilities, that cannot readily transfer to likely rivals.4 First, the political culture of the United States values technology strongly: technology is assumed to be the solution to most problems, including military ones. American culture also has a strong casualty aversion driven by an economy traditionally burdened by labor scarcity and by responsive political institutions that encourage the substitution of capital for labor to keep its own people out of harm’s way.5 The All-Volunteer Force reflects this by making military service voluntary and thus making military service expensive for government and service personnel lives ever-more-valuable and in need of husbanding. Second, competition is deeply engrained in defense, as it is in most of American society, stimulating new ideas and providing a diversity of approaches to any problem, in case one technology trajectory does not work out as hoped. Competition extends among the various military services and agencies, which each seek to propose solutions to the nation’s strategic problems, and among firms with different design-team philosophies. Third, the United States also welcomes foreign ideas much more readily than other countries, given U.S. openness to immigration, especially among the highly skilled and technically expert. Finally, a Cold-War organizational innovation in the United States created special public-private hybrid organizations, Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) that offer unbiased technical advice and a mechanism for the accumulation of knowledge – a unique social, relational system for institutional memory and systems integration capability that generally works very well. Other nations, with different divisions between the public and the private and dramatically different governance institutions, cannot easily copy these capabilities. These soft innovation factors particularly emphasize American advantages in the functional category of institutional factors – norms of seeing technology as a solution, trying hard to minimise casualties, using innovation as a means of competition among organizations, and welcoming foreign ideas. The institutional factors draw from the particular American mix of organizations, notably independent military services with strong identities, competitive firms in the defense industry that readily form networks or teams of suppliers even as each maintains its own core competencies and technical habits, and FFRDCs that help keep systems integration efforts honest and less parochial and that help preserve knowledge of false-start technology trajectories and craft skills that enable high-tech systems to function well.6 Because of the robustness of America’s input factors and the difficulty of copying its unique institutional factors, we conclude that the American defense innovation system will remain at the cutting edge and will not be surpassed by a potential international rival. In the final section, we explain why American leaders are so nervous anyway.

### 1NR---AT: No Link

#### The method collapses the only firms willing to work with the DoD, cedes market share to China, and enables espionage

Bateman 19, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Jon, 10-22-2019, “The Antitrust Threat to National Security”, *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-threat-to-national-security-11571784197>

But there are dangers in restructuring any U.S. industry. One of the most serious remains largely unrecognized: national-security risk. Despite their faults, tech companies contribute directly to American military and intelligence operations. Their titanic scale can itself be an asset. Any responsible antitrust debate must address the national security risks of breaking up Big Tech—and the parallel risks of keeping these companies intact.

Consider cloud computing. The Defense Department is planning a massive global cloud called JEDI. Unlike corporate clouds, the “war cloud” must support life-or-death missions on austere battlefields despite virtual or physical onslaughts. The Pentagon found only two eligible bidders: Amazon and [Microsoft](https://quotes.wsj.com/MSFT). Three defense secretaries, a federal judge and the Government Accountability Office have upheld this bidding process.

It is no coincidence the two eligible bidders have a combined market value of $1.9 trillion. Vast resources were needed to fund global networks of hardened data centers linked by undersea cables. The U.S. military’s unique demands required companies of unique scale. Yet one JEDI bidder faces a concerted breakup campaign (Amazon), and the other was nearly dissolved in 2001 (Microsoft).

Scale also matters in intelligence collection. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act compels U.S. companies to hand over data on suspected foreign agents. U.S. intelligence analysts increasingly rely on FISA to monitor terrorist communications or warn of cyberattacks. Tech giants have particular FISA value because their sheer popularity attracts users from around the world, including hostile actors. The largest tech companies provide some of the fastest-growing intelligence streams.

Splitting up Big Tech would reduce its intelligence value. First, smaller companies would lose global market share to foreign rivals such as Alibaba or Baidu, which can ignore FISA. Small U.S. sites can’t leverage the “network effect,” a gravitational force that helps large sites stay dominant. Intelligence collected from small sites would also be less useful. They see only narrow slices of online activity, whereas tech giants track users across sprawling internet ecosystems. Dismantling these ecosystems would put greater burden on intelligence agencies to “connect the dots” of potential threats.

#### Cracking down on Big Tech splinters America’s top innovators and dampens innovation across all sectors

Mitchell 21, JD, former Research Associate at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. (Trace, 3-3-2021, "Weaponizing Antitrust to Attack Big Tech Is a Bad Idea", *Morning Consult*, <https://morningconsult.com/opinions/weaponizing-antitrust-to-attack-big-tech-is-a-bad-idea/>)

From the House Judiciary report calling for dramatic antitrust reform to federal antitrust regulators and state attorneys general initiating lawsuits against Facebook and Google, government officials are once again calling for more aggressive antitrust enforcement to go after America’s tech businesses. And while critics from all sides are reaching for any and all tools to go after “Big Tech,” weaponizing antitrust will only end up harming American consumers and the American economy at a time when we’re still trying to keep our heads above water. Using antitrust to go after American tech won’t stop at Silicon Valley. Every sector of our economy will be at risk of politically motivated antitrust enforcement. And that won’t just hurt consumers searching for information on Google or shopping for products on Amazon — America’s economy could lose its global competitiveness amid a global pandemic. In fact, the recent cases against Google from the Department of Justice and state attorneys general are a great example of just how this misuse of antitrust could harm Americans across the country and halt innovation in its tracks. These suits conveniently forget how consumers benefit from Google’s suite of products in attempts to claim that Google unfairly monopolized the search and search advertising markets. Even worse, by claiming consumer harm, the government fails to truly grasp what consumers actually want. You see, under the consumer welfare standard, antitrust enforcement is built to focus on what consumers want and whether consumers benefit. When the government argues Google is harming Americans because its products are preinstalled and even the default search engine on Apple, the government forgets that American consumers don’t think this is a problem. The vast majority of search users prefer Google to its competitors. And through preinstallation, we get free-to-use products, quick searches and near-limitless information in an integrated system with the click of a mouse. It isn’t a problem; it’s a time saver. Further, because Google can reinvest in developing more user-friendly tech in a preinstalled ecosystem, we get interoperable apps that make our experience that much more convenient and intuitive. And even if consumers do want a different app, they can fix this problem with no heavy leg work or travel — just the swipe of a finger. But if the government gets its way, the message could be disastrous for innovation: Even if your business benefits Americans and improves the user experience, the government can still put a target on your back. Not to mention, the government would be more likely to put a target on your back if you’re large and politically disfavored. Consumers across the internet and the American economy would be hurt and left without more accessible and more affordable technology as options. We should be working to reward, not punish, innovation. Otherwise, the next Google may just decide it isn’t worth the time and effort. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission’s recent case against Facebook also puts the wants of policymakers above the actual interests of consumers. Here, the government claims that Facebook harms consumers by acquiring and then integrating services like Instagram and WhatsApp. So harmful, the Federal Trade Commission says, that Facebook must divest from these services, even if that would harm American consumers, innovation and entrepreneurship for decades to come. But this is not a case of consumer harm or bad behavior — Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp helped ensure that consumers’ desires were prioritized. Through millions of investment dollars into research and development, Facebook turned good services into great services that consumers actively keep coming back to. Through relentless product improvement, WhatsApp became a free-to-use platform and Instagram became one of the most successful photo-sharing social media apps in the world. In both cases, consumers benefited from convenient and state-of-the-art advancements. No longer do we have to pay to use messaging or search through multiple results to shop our influencer feed. As it stands, the Federal Trade Commission case could splinter one successful tech company into multiple, less efficient organizations, setting a precedent that could affect every American industry. Consumers would not only lose Facebook’s free-to-use services but also potentially the next big clothing brand or the next hit microbrewed beer. By impeding mergers, the sheer fear of potential antitrust enforcement would shutter the doors on small businesses from all sectors of the economy. So much investment in innovation is built on the possibility of being acquired by a larger player. Entrepreneurs and innovators from manufacturing, automotive and tech alike would be left with an unfortunate takeaway — succeed and benefit consumers, but not too much. And with an economy still struggling to recover, the absolute last thing we need is to leave consumers without innovative and affordable choices, small businesses without key investment opportunities and our economy without a competitive edge globally. But by weaponizing antitrust, we’ll get neither thoughtful intervention nor consumer benefits. Instead, the United States will lose ground to foreign competitors and American consumers will ultimately pay the price.

### 1NR---!---Framing

#### Even limited nuclear war causes extinction

Starr, MT, 17 (Interview of Steven Starr, MT (ASCP) @ School of Health Professions @ U of Missouri, Director @ Clinical Laboratory Science Program @ U of Missouri, Associate member @ Nuclear Peace Foundation, Conducted by Bryan Dyne, World Socialist Web Site, “Nuclear winter—the long-suppressed reality of nuclear war”, January 19th, 2017, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2017/01/19/nucl-j19.html) dlb

For more than three decades, the United States political and media establishment has conducted a coordinated campaign to whitewash the dangers of nuclear war. Using discredited science from the 1980s, US officials have adopted the policy that a nuclear first-strike against Russia could be “successful” and that the environmental dangers posed by multiple atomic or thermonuclear detonations—so-called nuclear winter—have been “disproven.”

Such attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons take on a new and ominous light when one considers the neo-McCarthyite rhetoric being used by congressional Republicans and top Democratic officials against Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as provocations like the deployment of 4,000 US troops and accompanying tanks, artillery and armored vehicles in Poland along Russia’s border. As significant sections of the United States government are preparing for war with nuclear-armed Russia, they simultaneously reject 34 years of peer-reviewed scientific research showing that a nuclear exchange threatens humanity’s extinction.

This perspective is reflected in the media. In 1987, the National Review described nuclear winter as a “fraud.” In 1990, the New York Times referred to the science as “discounted.” In 2000, Discover magazine included nuclear winter on its list of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” Since then, the danger of nuclear winter has largely been ignored and the scientists doing the research marginalized.

One of the scientists who has worked to expose the consequences of nuclear war to a mass audience is Steven Starr, an expert on the environmental dangers of nuclear weapons who has been published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. He has been involved in the research surrounding the climatic effects of nuclear detonations since 2001.

Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. His most recent publication is on the web site of the Federation of American Scientists, titled “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon – U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies.”

We recently spoke to Starr about some of the history, science and politics underlying the concept of nuclear winter and the fallacy that any country could somehow “win” a nuclear war.

Bryan Dyne: First, could you tell me something about your background and how you became so involved in exposing the full consequences of nuclear war?

Steven Starr: I’ve been fixated on nuclear war ever since experiencing the Cuban Missile Crisis in third grade. I remember the teachers huddled around a little black and white TV set and telling us to not look at the flash and to sit against the interior of the walls. All the duck-and-cover drills left an imprint on me.

Later on, I came across Carl Sagan’s book A Path Where No Man Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race which was published in 1990. In it, Sagan talks about the atmospheric research that was done in the 1980s that shows the climatic and environmental consequences that would be caused by a nuclear war. Sagan and four other NASA scientists looked at the data collected on the global dust storms on Mars and specifically were looking at the difference of the Martian surface temperature when there was a dust storm and when there wasn’t. Then they asked, “What could cause something similar on Earth?” The answers they came up with are volcanic eruptions or nuclear war.

This made me realize just how dangerous the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia really were. Even with the simple atmospheric models of the 1980s, it was clear that the massive firestorms created by a nuclear war would produce enough smoke and black carbon soot to block the majority of sunlight from reaching the surface of Earth. The original nuclear winter research predicted that a war fought with the nuclear arsenals of the 1980s would create temperatures colder than those experienced at the height of the last Ice Age 18,000 years ago. This would leave the Earth virtually uninhabitable. The recent research found that the original studies actually underestimated the consequences of nuclear war.

These peer-reviewed studies done in 2007 predict that even a war fought between India and Pakistan, in which a total of 100 atomic bombs were detonated in their cities, would produce enough soot and smoke to create the coldest temperatures experienced in the last 1,000 years. This would significantly decrease production of rice, corn and grain crops for several years, and the latest estimates from medical experts predict that as many as 2 billion people would starve as a result.

This modern research also shows how the hot smoke in the stratosphere would produce ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas in the Northern hemisphere. A fair-skinned individual outside in June during mid-day could get a painful sunburn in as little as six minutes. And a war fought with existing US and Russian nuclear arsenals is predicted to make agriculture impossible for a decade or longer, dooming most people to die from a nuclear famine.

Beginning in the late 1990s, I began to wonder why more research wasn’t being done on this topic, especially since the nuclear arsenals had changed significantly and because climate models had come a long way since the first study was done in 1983. Vastly improved computers allowed us to study the impact of nuclear war, not just the effects of a single weapon. What I learned was that there had been an active attempt to suppress this research and it had been done in a variety of ways.

First was a study published by the National Center for Atmospheric Research in 1986 by Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, which claimed that the original nuclear winter studies overestimated the amount of soot that would be tossed into the upper atmosphere. Starley and Schneider used a primitive model (with a 20-day run) to incorrectly claim that only 50 percent of the smoke generated from the nuclear explosions would make it into the stratosphere and that the rest would be rained out. The phrase “nuclear autumn” was derived from this non-peer reviewed study and was used to belittle the previous work.

The “nuclear autumn” story was published by Foreign Affairs and was then spread to a variety of news outlets including National Review, the Wall Street Journal, Time magazine and the New York Times. In 2000, Discover magazine even included nuclear winter in its list of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.”

After the success of the smear campaign against nuclear winter, most people eventually accepted this narrative and funding for new research dried up. This had a big impact on the public, who got the impression that the nuclear winter theory had been disproven. As a result, this issue is hardly ever talked about now in the mainstream media.

BD: Do you think there were political pressures involved in turning “nuclear winter” into nuclear autumn?

SS: There was definitely a lot of backlash from various industrial and military interests against the first nuclear winter research. The scientists were called “frauds” and the research labeled “bad science.” One of the reasons for this is that over the years, trillions of dollars have been spent on nuclear weapons. If the conclusions of the nuclear winter research—that nuclear war is suicide for all peoples and nations—had gained widespread acceptance and understanding, it is likely that the whole nuclear weapons industry would have been shut down.

The scientists were pressured into stopping nuclear winter-related research because the funding for such research was cut. They should have gotten the highest award for making people aware of these dangers but instead they were persecuted. Taking away funding is a very effective way to silence the scientific community.

It didn’t work perfectly. Sagan, for example, continued to give talks and reports about this topic, and many scientists remained interested and concerned. My first attempts in 2001 to help find funding for new nuclear winter research projects were unsuccessful in large part because most people I contacted, including anti-nuclear weapon activists, believed that nuclear winter had been scientifically discredited. When Brian Toon, Alan Robock, Mike Mills and other scientists finally managed to get the newest research done (beginning in 2007), it was mostly self-funded using the resources of their labs. They’ve tried to get funding from the National Academy of Sciences for more detailed follow-up work on the many catastrophic effects of nuclear winter, but they haven’t been successful.

Even so, the science in their recent studies has been peer-reviewed and has survived all criticism of the global scientific community—it is considered to be top-notch science. What’s more, the scientists were essentially quite conservative in their estimates and predictions. For example, their findings indicated that 7 million tons of smoke would rise into the stratosphere after the India-Pakistan 100-atomic-bomb war, but the scientists used 5 million tons for their estimates on effects. Likewise, for their two models of a US-Russian nuclear war, the largest weapon they used in their calculations was a 100-kiloton bomb, when in reality most Russian weapons are 800 kilotons, and many US weapons are 300 and 475 kilotons. Using these more conservative figures acted to reduce the likely thermal effects and corresponding amounts of smoke released by their hypothetical wars.

BD: So what do politicians and generals think will happen if there is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia? Do they realize the environmental dangers of nuclear war?

SS: It’s hard to get an answer from any ranking elected official. They always have a cadre of assistants surrounding them that make it hard for you to give them something to read. However, my friend Greg Mello, the secretary and executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, was once able to pose the question of nuclear winter to the US Nuclear Weapons Council. This group includes the head of the US Strategic Command and is what makes US policy on nuclear weapons. Their attitude was essentially, “We don’t believe in nuclear winter.” Their focus is instead stopping “nuclear terrorism” and other scenarios that only involve a single nuclear weapon.

This makes no sense. The United States and Russia each have about 1,000 of what I call “launch-ready” nuclear weapons. In the US, this means that the solid-fuel engines of the intercontinental ballistic missiles are powered up 24 hours a day, awaiting the order to launch. It only takes minutes for the president to open the nuclear briefcase, which accompanies him at all times, and give the order to fire these weapons. A similar briefcase also follows President Putin.

These launch-ready weapons are inherently dangerous. They are supposed to act as a deterrent, but think about what deterrence actually means. It’s based on the idea of being capable of inflicting unacceptable retaliation on somebody. If you attack us, we’ll destroy you. But classical deterrence doesn’t say you have to launch your weapons in 15 minutes or less, it just says you have to at some point be able to launch them. The short time frame came in when the military decided it needed to launch their weapons upon warning of attack, before the attack arrived.

In other words, launch-ready nuclear weapons are essentially preemptive weapons. If the US early warning systems detect a missile launch, the President can order a launch of retaliatory nuclear strike before incoming nuclear warheads take out communication systems and weapons. Of course, if this is a false warning of attack, then the “retaliatory” strike becomes a first-strike and a nuclear war has started.

Moreover, if somebody has launched a nuclear strike against the silos in which your nuclear weapons are housed in, you don’t retaliate by targeting their empty silos. You target their cities. Russia only has about 230 cities with a population greater than 100,000 and the US has 312. So it’s not that hard to wipe out a couple hundred cities in an initial salvo.

For many years, the entire global dialogue about nuclear weapons has focused primarily on the possible use of a single nuclear weapon by terrorists. This fits the official narrative on terrorism, but it ignores the existential danger posed by a nuclear war fought with existing US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

There is another problem with focusing only on a single nuclear weapon. Let’s say NATO or Polish forces attack Kaliningrad, an important but isolated enclave for the Russian navy. Russia doesn’t have the conventional forces to stop such an attack; would it use nuclear weapons to prevent the loss of Kaliningrad? Once a US/NATO-Russian war begins, how does it stop—which side will admit defeat? Once nuclear weapons are used, what prevents more from being used?

The strategists often say, “Oh, well, Russia will back down.” What if they don’t? And why would they back down on their own border? Any US/NATO-Russian direct military conflict will very likely lead to a full-scale nuclear war.

BD: You mention in one of your articles that the US is “sleepwalking towards nuclear war.” Is this sleepwalking or a deliberate policy?

SS: That’s a legitimate question. I agree with you. “Sleepwalking” was the most polite way I could say it.

To give an example, Foreign Affairs published an article in 2006 written by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press called “The Rise of Nuclear Primacy.” It was very disquieting, basically claiming that the weapon systems in the US had gotten to the point where it could undertake a first strike against Russia and Russia would lose any ability to retaliate. Nuclear primacy conveyed the idea that the US could “win” a nuclear war against Russia should the US attack first—except that Lieber and Press took no account of the environmental consequences of such a first strike. Robock and Toon tell us that the resulting nuclear famine from such a nuclear first strike would kill the inhabitants of the side that “won” the war.

Russia also fears that the US/NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) that has been deployed at sea and on land surrounding Russia could be used as part of a US first-strike. This is because Russia considers BMD to have offensive capabilities, that it could be used as a “mop up” system to take out any surviving Russian missiles not destroyed in a nuclear first strike.

This has led to Russia targeting the US/NATO Ballistic Missile Defense sites that the US has set up in Eastern Europe, including the operational system in Romania and the one being built in Poland. Russia also sees a special threat from these facilities because they can also be used to launch nuclear-armed cruise missiles. This fact has been widely discussed on Russian mass media and the Russian people are demanding that Putin take some action against these sites.

BD: Given how dangerous nuclear war is, what do you think of the increasingly hysterical denunciations of Russia and the Russian government in the US media and by the Democrats and Republicans?

SS: It’s very disconcerting to see the leadership of both the Democrats and Republicans to come out with this type of thinking. These anti-Putin and anti-Russian stories keep coming up on thousands of different media sources simultaneously, including the New York Times and Washington Post, which are supposed to be the newspapers of record, and it acts like a smear campaign. Almost all such stories are based on no information or false information and they have created a narrative that is pushing us toward war with Russia. There are no two ways about it.

A war with China wouldn’t be any better. China happens to be a strategic partner of Russia. They also have 20-30 ICBMs that carry three-megaton warheads; each warhead could set 600 square miles on fire. China also has submarine-launched ballistic missiles that can be armed with nuclear warheads.

Yet there is no discussion of the existential threat of nuclear war in the US. This has to be the starting place for any discussion on nuclear weapons. If we have the best scientists in the world telling us that a nuclear war would wipe out most of the human race, that should be our primary concern. Why should these arsenals even be allowed to exist?

## Case

#### Debating about specific policy options is the only way to meaningfully shift public policy for persons with disabilities ⁠— the aff merely points out causes of oppression without focusing on the details of potential policy responses

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Each of these developments has a connection to public policy. Technological innovation and utilization can be demanded, subsidized, discouraged, or outlawed by the state. The same is true of sorting and ASL training. To date, U.S. policy has been relatively decentralized. Neither cochlear implants nor genetic screening is mandated or heavily regulated in terms of the reasons for use. Gallaudet was chartered by the federal government and state law imposes some restrictions on the creation of new municipalities, yet these sorting efforts are largely the product of private choices. With strong enough justifications and political forces, public policy might shift. Society might begin to treat genetic screening and cochlear implants as morally questionable and unjustifiably stigmatizing for the current generation of deaf people, or [\*1275] it might invest more resources in nonverbal communication methods including ASL, or it might heavily subsidize signing communities. Moving policy in the opposite direction is equally possible in theoretical terms. A collective decision might be made to hasten the elimination of deafness-related genes, or to mainstream all deaf people and discourage ASL as inappropriately separatist. The question is whether the social model can underwrite any policy, in any direction. The answer is no: the model suggests causes of disadvantage, but what we do about it is a matter of contested norms. Opposition to social restructuring as a remedy for disability need not be the product of ignorance, insensitivity, false consciousness, or political immorality. It might be an understandable reaction within a coherent normative framework. There just is no necessary connection between causes of harm (or disadvantage) and remedies for harm (or disadvantage). This simple point can be confirmed by comparing similar situations in which an individual is not the sole cause of his or her disadvantage, and yet it is at least debatable (1) whether any remedy is justified or (2) which remedy is proper. Consider the following statements. Your inability to get through this door is caused by the confluence of more than one factor: 1. You murdered your husband to collect insurance proceeds, and because of that we prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned you. 2. Your skin is relatively dark, our customers prefer to interact with pink-skinned people, and so we did not hire you. 3. You are Catholic, we hate Catholics, and so we did not hire you. 4. You became wheelchair-bound after negligently driving a motorcycle, and we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance. 5. Your genes do not allow you to walk, your parents did not genetically screen for such embryos, you now use a wheelchair, and we built this building with stairs leading to the entrance. Each of these statements has a similar logical structure, and that structure mimics the social model of disability. Choices or practices of the broader society are disadvantaging the subject of the statements. But we can be confident that almost no one will demand social change and liberation of the subject in all of the above examples. Take statement 1. The subject is deprived of liberty by a physical barrier (her cell door) not only because of her decision to kill her husband (we might say she has the trait of spouse killer), but also because institutional forces responded in a particular way (officers of the state engaged in apprehension, prosecution, imprisonment). They need not [\*1276] have been designed to respond that way or exercised their powers in this case. But they were and they did. Very few observers will object to the social response. Assuming accurate adjudication of guilt, no affirmative defense, defensible sentencing, and so on, no plausible normative theory dictates any liberating remedy for the killer. Statements 2 and 3 prompt different normative reactions. Like statement 1, these situations involve a subject who suffers on account of a social or institutional reaction to an individual trait. There is nothing natural and immutable about pinker skinned people preferring not to interact with darker skinned people, or non-Catholics hating Catholics -- it might not have been a foreordained biological or social development that the pink/dark skin or Catholic/non-Catholic distinctions came about, or that given the distinction people would have the opportunity to interact across those categories. In any event, statements 2 and 3 involve animus or irrational distinctions between people. Statement 2 describes a business decision that is derivative of indefensible social preferences, but the engine of discrimination in those statements is basically the same. If we agree that the traits of skin color and Catholicism are unjustifiable bases for economic outcomes, and that social or institutional practices should be changed rather than those who suffer from the practices, a particular remedy must be selected. And there is room for debate. One might prefer antidiscrimination regulation and litigation over subsidies and public education campaigns (or vice versa), or one might hope that marketplace competition will take care of the problem. But we should perceive a structural similarity among statements 1, 2, and 3 without making anything like the same normative commitment to remedy the identified disadvantages. At a minimum it should be accepted that a normative framework is mediating a logical gap between causes of disadvantage and the appropriate response. Finally, consider statements 4 and 5. They are variations on the example nearly always used to illustrate the social model. Here the disadvantage involves a trait that impairs the ability to move by walking in conjunction with the architectural preference of others for stairs. By now, the setup has a familiar form. It is possible to draw a normative distinction between the two statements. One might believe the subject in statement 4 is morally responsible for his impairment, or that society should be careful about awarding remedies where it might reduce incentives to be careful. Either position militates against a legal remedy without necessarily deciding the outcome in statement 5. That situation effectively removes responsibility for the relevant impairment from the subject, while highlighting the possibility that third parties (here, the parents) could have taken steps to prevent producing a child with the impairment. Perhaps that fact will influence the [\*1277] choice between reconstructing the environment we have been left with and engineering the human beings we create. Even if the parents' opportunity is irrelevant to the policy response, there is still the issue of cost. Is it justifiable to retrofit the building in light of scarce resources and other needs? Should obligations of social restructuring only apply going forward? What is the correct timeframe within which to answer these questions? This choice might be much more difficult than the issue of murder for cash in statement 1; but there is a choice to be made, and it is irreducibly normative in a way that cannot be solved by enhancing the accuracy of our causation portrait. All of this applies to the Deaf culture controversies. At least part of any disadvantage associated with deafness fits the social model. Lack of hearing can be inhibiting when others communicate with the spoken word. More than one response to this situation is possible: one might decide that no response is appropriate considering resource constraints, or that deaf people should have subsidized access to cochlear implants, or that genetic screening should be used to minimize the number of deaf people, or that ASL instruction should be expanded, or that deaf people should have greater opportunities to sort themselves into sign language communities -- or the opposite of any of these responses. To be sure, our country has progressed to the point where few if any will attempt to justify treating physically or mentally impaired individuals like the killer in statement 1. It is no longer so impolite to be impaired. n90 And forced segregation is less popular in the U.S. today, n91 let alone coerced sterilization. n92 But the recognition of multiple causal factors in the generation of disadvantage is not an answer to the question, "what do we do now?"

#### Even if political liberalism currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it and bailing on it is worse

Badano 13, PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London (Gabriele Badano, April 2013, “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled.

5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

#### The alt’s framework is fatalistic ⁠— it’s necessary for participation in political areas for disabled people in a neoliberal society

Dowse 9, (Leanne Dowse, 7-22-2009, “’Some people are never going to be able to do that.’ Challenges for people with intellectual disability in the 21st century,” Disability & Society, pp. 573-574)

The emphasis on the achievement of individual independence and productivity precipitated by globalisation and embedded in neo-liberalism effectively renders people with intellectual disability, who are often unable to attain self-sustainability, problematic. The new technologies of welfare are economically driven and actively directed toward investing in the individual pursuit of independence, framing inclusion in terms of productivity and contribution, rather than self-fulfilment or quality of life. This has differential impacts on the range of people with intellectual disability, including those who are able to participate in the employment market and those with high support needs who will not be part of the labour market. Cognitive limitations and prescribed incompetence deem at least some people with intellectual disability to be inadequate choice makers. This deficit approach presumes an incapacity to reason and results in the relinquishing of claims for justice, where equality and rights become constrained or redirected (Wasserman 2001). Perceived as unable to achieve independence, such people are then seemingly relegated to dependency relationships where they are likely to be continuously placed under protective moral custodianship whereby their ‘best interests’ are determined by more competent others. Protections which set out who can take decisions on behalf of another, under what circumstances and how this may be done are exemplified in statutory frameworks such as the UK mental capacity Act 2005 or the range of state-based guardianship legislation in the Australian context. While operating at one level to protect individuals with intellectual disability, these frameworks also contain the risk that participation in the public arena may be restricted, denied or exempt. Developments in social policy over the past half century have made progress towards improving the material conditions of people with intellectual disability by giving them access to more ‘normal’ or ‘better quality’ lives. Some approaches have also recognised, in part, the political agency of people with intellectual disability. The political project of self-advocacy has, over the past 30 years, worked to cultivate the voices and knowledges of people with intellectual disability. Access to recognition, legitimacy and participation in the political arenas where issues to do with their social management are debated continues to be complex for people with intellectual disability as a collective. A focus on the support of this representation must be a fundamental underpinning to the repositioning of people with intellectual disability in a globalised world.

#### Liberalism can include individuals with disabilities

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